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I. INTRODUCTION
Three nights a week Bill Delaney’s daughters spend the night with
their fathers, a gay couple, and for the remainder of the week, the girls stay
with their mothers, a lesbian couple.1  The children have four parents, and
even though Mr. Delaney is the girls’ biological father, he is not one of
their legal parents.2  This is because California law, before the passage of
Senate Bill 274, provided that a child could have only two legal parents.3 
As a result, the law did not protect Mr. Delaney’s relationship with his
children and did not protect the rights of the children to their father. Mr.
Delaney stated that having the law recognize him as a legal parent would
give his entire family a greater sense of security: “‘This would be the
final piece, so we don’t have to worry if something happens to the legal
1. Ian Lovett, Measure Opens Door to 3 Parents, or More, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 
2012, at A9.
2. Id. at A13. Mr. Delaney’s situation is not atypical.  For example, same-sex 
couples sometimes choose to use a friend as a sperm donor or surrogate and intend the 
child to have a parent-child relationship with all three adults. See infra text accompanying 
notes 30–32. 
3. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129–32 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (holding that the California law, which precluded the child’s biological father 
from rebutting the marital presumption, was constitutional such that the child had only
two legal parents); In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 861, 877 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding
that the juvenile court erred when it failed to resolve the competing presumptions of
three presumed parents—the biological mother, the mother’s partner, and the biological 
father—such that the child had only two legal parents).  But see CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c)
(West 2014) (allowing California courts to find that a child has more than two legal 
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parents or if I am out with the kids and something happens . . . .’ ‘Legally,
they could just take my kids and I couldn’t do anything about it.’”4 
Mr. Delaney’s situation illustrates the difficulties that nontraditional 
families face.  Children, who are being parented by more than two adults, 
are not legally protected in their relationships with more than two parents.
As a result, children can be deprived of their relationships with people 
who have been functioning as their parents, people who they love and call
“mom” and “dad.”  Moreover, the children have no recourse in the event
their legal parents wish to end their own relationships with the adults. 
Likewise, the adults have no right to maintain their relationships with the
children.  These adults may wish to contribute to the children’s college
funds and may want to teach them something the legal parents are unable 
to.5 
Currently, most states’ laws provide that children can have only two
legal parents.6  This limitation is a bright-line rule that prevents a court
4. Lovett, supra note 1, at A13.  As Professor Nancy Polikoff of American 
University Washington College of Law stated,
“This is about looking at the reality of children’s lives, which are heterogeneous, as
opposed to maintaining a fiction of homogeneity. . . .” “Families are different 
from one another.  If the law will not acknowledge that, then it’s not responding 
to the needs of children who do not fit into the one-size-fits-all box.”
Id. at A9, A13. 
5. Interview with Robert C. Fellmeth, Professor & Exec. Dir., Univ. of San Diego
Sch. of Law Children’s Advocacy Inst., in San Diego, Cal. (Feb. 8, 2013). Professor 
Fellmeth is of the belief that the more parents who are willing to contribute to the child’s 
college fund, the better.
6. See Lovett, supra note 1, at A9 (“[M]ost other states . . . recognize[] no more 
than two legal parents.”).  But see, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (giving courts the 
discretion to find that a child has more than two legal parents); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 8-201 (2009) (providing for de facto parent status); D.C. CODE § 16-831.01 (2012) 
(providing for de facto parent status); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 191, 197, 198 (2005) 
(allowing the mother, biological father, or child to rebut the marital presumption, thereby
specifically providing for dual fatherhood); Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 475– 
76, 481–82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (affirming the trial court’s custody order, which granted 
shared custody to three adults).
Because most states limit parentage to two people, courts are forced to choose a
maximum of two parents for a child. This creates a King Solomon’s Dilemma, requiring
the court to choose who the child’s two legal parents are, even though more than two
people qualify for legal parent status by functioning as parents to the child.  See 1 Kings
3:16–28. In the Bible, King Solomon had to determine who a child’s mother was 
because of two women’s competing claims.  Id. at 3:22–23. King Solomon ordered the 
child to be cut in half and for each woman to receive half of the child.  Id. at 3:24–25. 
After this order, the child’s mother pleaded with King Solomon to give the child to the





















   
  
  
      
     
     








     
   
 
from finding that a child has more than two legal parents, even if the court
thinks such a finding would be best for the child.  There is a danger in 
having a bright-line rule apply to situations where it should not.7 Under 
the Constitution, parents have the right to parent their children as they see
fit.8  In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the state cannot interfere, 
and neither can third parties, including grandparents.9  However, “this 
simple rule is under increasing pressure, in an age of complex families, 
in which multiple adults have parent-like relationships with children.”10 
Because “[t]he family is the fundamental unit of society,”11 as the number 
of nontraditional families grows, the law must evolve to provide them with
child.  Id. at 3:26. In response, King Solomon ordered the child to be given to the 
woman who wanted to spare the child because she was the child’s mother.  Id. at 3:27. 
Like King Solomon, courts in states with a two-parent limit are forced to determine which
two parents’ claims are superior.  King Solomon devised a way to determine which woman
was the child’s mother.  Here, courts are forced to decide who a child’s legal parents are
when all three people have been acting as parents to the child, which is arguably an even
more difficult situation.
7. Interview with Robert C. Fellmeth, supra note 5. 
8. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 139 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“Throughout our decisionmaking in this important area runs the theme that 
certain interests and practices—freedom from physical restraint, marriage, childbearing,
childrearing, and others—form the core of our definition of ‘liberty.’”); Lassiter v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 38 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[A]lthough the 
Constitution is verbally silent on the specific subject of families, freedom of personal
choice in matters of family life long has been viewed as a fundamental liberty interest 
worthy of protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (“Without doubt, [the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment] 
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to 
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates 
of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common 
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”); JOANNA L. GROSSMAN 
& LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY 
AMERICA 17 (2011) (“One of the primary rules in this society—so basic we never think
much about it—is that the state, government, collective, or whatever one calls it, leaves
child-rearing essentially alone.  There are no legal rules about how to raise children. . . . Early 
in the twentieth century, this was elevated to a constitutional right.  Fit parents were 
entitled under the Constitution to make decisions about the ‘care, custody, and control’ 
of their children.”).
9. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 17; see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 
U.S. 57, 60, 71–75 (2000) (holding that a Washington statute, which provided that anyone
could petition the court for visitation rights at any time, violated the mother’s substantive 
due process rights as applied to permit the paternal grandparents to have visitation
following the death of the children’s father). For a discussion of the legal parentage 
argument made on behalf of kinship caregivers, see generally Sacha M. Coupet, “Aint I 
A Parent?”: The Exclusion of Kinship Caregivers from the Debate over Expansions of
Parenthood, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 595 (2010). 
10. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 17–18. 
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protection.12  Courts have continued to “redefine and broaden” the term
parent, and as a result, there are an increasing number of family structures
in which more than two people fit the definition.13  Even though courts
have responded by expanding the definition of parent to include more 
than two people, “they have maintained the rigid idea that a child can have
only two legal parents.”14  Despite expanding the definition of parent and 
granting rights to third parties, courts are doing so without granting parental
status.15  “[W]ithout recognition as a legal parent, a person may be seen in
12. See Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental
Rights and Responsibilities To Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309,
311, 325–26 (2007) (“Legal parents enjoy considerable protection from state and third-
party interference.”); cf. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 1–2 (“The ways in which 
law and the legal system impact the family—regulate it, affect it, mold it, challenge it, or
perhaps even ignore it—are, naturally, as variable as the forms of families themselves. . . .
Family law follows family life.  That is, what happens to families in this society,
determines what happens to the law of the family.  Law is not autonomous; it does not 
evolve according to some mysterious inner program; it grows and decays and shifts and 
fidgets in line with what is happening in the larger society.”).
13. Deborah H. Wald, The Parentage Puzzle: The Interplay Between Genetics,
Procreative Intent, and Parental Conduct in Determining Legal Parentage, 15 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 379, 381 (2007) (“When we look to intent and conduct— 
instead of only biology or marriage—to create legal parent-child relationships, it quickly
becomes clear that there may be more than two people who are candidates for the legal 
title ‘parent.’”).
14. Id. (“Thus, even when courts find that three or more adults have standing to 
seek parentage, the outcome of such cases still tends to protect the child’s relationship 
with only two of those adults. Frequently the best interests of the child are neither 
considered in the process nor served by the outcome.”); see also In re M.C., 123 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 856, 861, 877 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the juvenile court erred when it 
failed to resolve the competing presumptions such that the child had only two legal
parents); Melanie B. Jacobs, More Parents, More Money: Reflections on the Financial 
Implications of Multiple Parentage, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 217, 221 (2010) 
(advocating that all adults who intend to have a parental relationship with a child be 
given legal parent status); Jacobs, supra note 12, at 324 (“[C]ourts apply the various doctrines 
to ensure that a child has two, and only two, legal parents.” (citing In re Marriage of
Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282–83, 291 (Ct. App. 1998))). 
15. See Katharine K. Baker, Marriage and Parenthood as Status and Rights: The 
Growing, Problematic and Possibly Constitutional Trend To Disaggregate Family Status
from Family Rights, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 127, 129 (2010).  Professor Baker discusses this
phenomenon in the context of same-sex marriage. Id. In Strauss v. Horton, the California 
Supreme Court held that although same-sex couples have a fundamental right “to 
establish an officially recognized family relationship,” they do not have a fundamental 
right “to the designation of marriage.”  207 P.3d 48, 76 (Cal. 2009).  By so holding, Ms. 
Baker states that the court “disaggregated family rights from family status, finding a 




   



























the law as a third party or ‘legal stranger’ who is not entitled to a 
relationship with a child with whom the individual has fostered a parental 
relationship.”16 
Legal parents are able to enjoy all of the benefits of parentage and are
responsible for all of its duties.17 If a court does not deem a person who
has been acting as a parent to a child to be one of the child’s legal parents,
that person has no rights with respect to the child.18 As a result, both the 
child and adult may be deprived of a relationship, and the child may be 
deprived of any financial support the adult could have provided. Thus,
the current state of the law leaves both adults and children vulnerable.  To 
protect these families, state legislatures should give courts the discretion to
find that a child has more than two legal parents if such a finding is in the
child’s best interest. 
This Comment reviews the current state of parental rights and proposes
statutory clarifications that would provide courts with the power to find
that a child has more than two legal parents. 
access to the latter”—through Proposition 8.  Baker, supra, at 128 (citing Strauss, 207 
P.3d at 76).
16. Jacobs, supra note 12, at 317 (citing Sally F. Goldfarb, Visitation for 
Nonparents After Troxel v. Granville: Where Should States Draw the Line?, 32 RUTGERS 
L.J. 783, 787 (2001)); accord Jacobs, supra note 14 (arguing that a third parent should
be granted legal parent status because the status protects the adult’s relationship with a 
child the adult has parented and protects the child, who relies on the adult’s emotional 
and financial support). 
17. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118–19 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(“[T]he sum of parental rights with respect to the rearing of a child, includ[e] the child’s
care; the right to the child’s services and earnings; the right to direct the child’s
activities; the right to make decisions regarding the control, education, and health of the
child; and the right, as well as the duty, to prepare the child for additional obligations, 
which includes the teaching of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good
citizenship.” (quoting 4 CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW § 60.02(1)(b) (C. Markey ed., 1987) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601 (West 1983); CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 4600 (West 1983))).  Professor Jacobs writes that more than two people 
often share parental duties. See Jacobs, supra note 12, at 312–13. Therefore, in the 
event that “three (or more) individuals financially and emotionally support the child and
fully agree that all three should be active participants in the child’s life—why not 
recognize the legal parent-child relationship for all three parents?” Id. at 313. 
18. For example, a nonbiological parent may have no right to visit the child 
following the termination of that parent’s relationship with one of the child’s biological 
parents. See Wald, supra note 13, at 382. Similarly, the child may have no right to
maintain a relationship with the nonbiological parent.  Id. The two-parent rule is not 
limited to nonbiological parents.  See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129–32 (holding that 
a California law, which precluded the child’s biological father from rebutting the marital
presumption, did not violate the biological father’s procedural or substantive due process 
rights and that the child did not have a due process right to maintain filial relationships 
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Part II provides background information on the decline of the traditional
family.  The Part reviews how the law of parentage has progressed over 
time and provides an overview of the laws of several states and Canada 
that provide rights to, and impose duties on, a third parent.  Part III discusses
California Senate Bill 1476, which, had Governor Jerry Brown signed it 
into law in 2012, would have given California courts the discretion to find 
that a child has more than two legal parents if such a finding was in the
child’s best interest. The Part concludes with a discussion of California
Senate Bill 274, which Governor Brown signed into law in 2013, and 
allows California courts to find that a child has more than two legal
parents if not making the finding would be detrimental to the child.  Part 
IV discusses one court’s recognition of the fundamental right of children 
to maintain familial bonds.  Part V outlines the criticism of Senate Bill 
1476 and the expansion of legal parentage in general.  Part VI responds 
to these criticisms and provides support for expanding the two-parent limit.
Part VII details my proposed reforms to the current state of parentage
law. The Part delves into the advantages of allowing courts to recognize
more than two legal parents and discusses why it is necessary for the
legislatures to give courts this discretion. Part VIII concludes. 
II. PARENTAGE LAW BACKGROUND 
A. The Modern Family 
The “traditional” family, in which a child’s parents are husband and 
wife, has been steadily declining for years.19  Divorce rates have been on
the rise, resulting in an increase in the number of stepparent families.20 
19. See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 3 (“Perhaps the single most 
important trend [in family law] was the decline of the traditional family, the family as it
was understood in the nineteenth century, the family of the Bible and conventional 
morality.  The traditional family, in the twentieth century, came under greater and greater
pressure; and in some ways, it came apart at the seams.”); Jacobs, supra note 12, at 310 
(discussing the decline of the traditional family and the rise in the number of new family
forms); Wald, supra note 13, at 381 (“[T]his model ‘traditional’ family is no longer the 
norm, or even the majority . . . .”).
20. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 n.8 (Cal. 1993) (“[R]ising divorce
rates have made multiple parent arrangements common in our society . . . .”); see also
GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 13–14 (discussing the transition from the old 
fault-based system of divorce to the new no-fault “revolution” across states). The
number of people currently divorced or separated increased from 5% in 1960 to 14% in














   
 
 
   
  
   
   
 








   
 
   
 
   
   
    
 
     
 
From 1960–2008, the percentage of married American adults declined
while the number of unmarried mothers increased substantially from 1940 
to the 1990s.21  In 1985, 22% of all children were born to unmarried 
mothers.22  This number increased to 32% in 1997, and by the end of 2008, 
the number of unmarried mothers had risen to 40.6%.23  Meanwhile, single
people and couples have increasingly turned to surrogacy and assisted
reproductive technology (ART) to have children.24  ART consists of fertility
treatments involving both eggs and sperm, such as in vitro fertilization.25 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/11/18/the-decline-of-marriage-and-rise-of-new-families/
2/; see also Wald, supra note 13, at 380 (“A collection of factors have combined to make 
this an extraordinarily complex and confusing time in history for determining legal 
parentage of children. . . . [This includes] [t]he rise in divorce rates and the accompanying
rise in stepparent and ‘blended’ families . . . .”).  For a discussion of second-parent adoption, 
specifically step-partner adoption and inheritance rights, see Peter Wendel, Inheritance 
Rights and the Step-Partner Adoption Paradigm: Shades of the Discrimination Against
Illegitimate Children, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 351 (2005). 
21. The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New Families, supra note 20 (“In 1960, 
72% of American adults were married.  By 2008, that share had fallen to 52%.”); see 
also Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. 
REV. 649, 651 (2008) (“Increased reliance on private ordering, decreased demand for
marriage as an institution to take care of women’s economic dependency and relaxed 
norms with regard to sexual activity have simply made marriage less primary than it used
to be.” (footnotes omitted)); Stephanie J. Ventura & Christine A. Bachrach, Nonmarital 
Childbearing in the United States, 1940–99, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Oct. 18, 2000, at 
2, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr48/nvs48_16.pdf (reporting that
the number of nonmarital births “rose thirteenfold between 1940 and 1994, from 89,500 
in 1940 to 1.17 million in 1990”). 
22. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 20 (citing Brady E. Hamilton et al., 
Births: Preliminary Data for 2008, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Apr. 6, 2010, at 6, tbl.1,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58_16.pdf).
23. Id. (citing Hamilton et al., supra note 22). 
24. See id. (discussing the advent of surrogacy and in vitro fertilization and the 
family variations that can result).
There were egg mothers who were not womb mothers, and womb mothers who 
were not egg mothers—women who carried somebody else’s (genetic) child
inside their belly.  A child could have an egg mother, a womb mother, a sperm
donor father, as well as a mother and father who intended to raise him or her. 
There were gay couples who adopted a child or made use of a surrogate mother; 
and lesbian couples who had babies through artificial insemination.  There 
were even children whose biological parents had died before the children were
even conceived. 
Id.; see also Wald, supra note 13, at 380–81 (“A collection of factors have combined to
make this an extraordinarily complex and confusing time in history for determining legal 
parentage of children. . . . [This includes] [t]he rapid changes in medical technology 
whereby egg donors, sperm donors, in vitro fertilization, and surrogacy are becoming
commonplace . . . .”). For an in-depth discussion of the law as it relates to families created
through the use of donors, see Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367 (2012). 
25. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2009 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES 3 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART 2009/ 
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Since 1978, the year that the first “test-tube baby” was born, there have 
been an estimated 5 million children born as a result of ART.26  In fact,
people in the United States have been using ART since 1981 to help women 
become pregnant.27  From the 443 fertility clinics that reported data, “[t]he
147,260 ART cycles performed at these reporting clinics in 2010 resulted in
. . . 61,564 infants.”28 
With the increased use of ART, it has become more common for children
to have more than two parents.29  This avenue to multiple parenthood has
accelerated because of the needs of infertile and same-sex couples.  
Same-sex couples sometimes choose to use a friend as a sperm donor or 
surrogate and intend the child to have a parent-child relationship with all 
three adults.30  When the three adults decide not to parent the child as a 
in 2002, about 1.2 million, or 2%, had had an infertility-related medical appointment 
within the previous year and an additional 10% had received infertility services at some
time in their lives.”).
26. See EUROPEAN SOC’Y OF HUMAN REPROD. & EMBRYOLOGY, FOCUS ON 
REPRODUCTION 8 (2012), available at http://www.eshre.eu/ESHRE/English/Publications/ 
Focus-on-Reproduction/September-2012/page.aspx/1712.  In 2011, the cumulative total 
births as a result of ART was 4.6 million, and in 2012, that number rose to 5 million.  Id.; 
Jeanna Bryner, 5 Million Babies Born from IVF, Other Reproductive Technologies, 
LIVESCIENCE (July 3, 2010, 10:52 AM), http://www.livescience.com/21355-5-million-
babies-born-ivf-technologies.html. 
27. See  CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 25, at 1 (“[A]bout
12% of women of childbearing age in the United States have used an infertility service.”). 
28. 2010 Assisted Reproductive Technology Fertility Clinic Success Rates Report, 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2010/
index.htm (last updated Jan. 30, 2013).  This statistic does not include “banking cycles and
cycles in which a new treatment procedure was being evaluated.” Id.  In 2009, 441
fertility clinics reported data indicating there were 146,244 ART cycles resulting in 60,190 
infants.  2009 Assisted Reproductive Technology Report, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2009/ (last updated Mar. 7, 2012). 
29. Those potential parents include “genetic sperm or egg donors, gestational birth
mothers, and a variety of functional parents such as stepparents, foster parents, and other 
caregivers.” Jacobs, supra note 12, at 309, 325. 
30. See Wald, supra note 13, at 398–99.  For example, in the opening example, 
the family consists of a gay couple and a lesbian couple, who decided to parent their
children together.  Despite their decision to do this, the law at the time of the story did
not afford legal protection to all of their parent-child relationships.  Although the
children consider all four adults their parents, at the time, the children under California 
law could have only two legal parents.  As a result, the children had no legally protected 
relationship with their father, Mr. Delaney, even though he is one of their biological 
parents. Lovett, supra note 1, at A9. But see Kevin Gray, Florida Judge Approves Birth
Certificate Listing Three Parents, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 7, 2013), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/
_news/2013/02/07/16889720-florida-judge-approves-birth-certificate-listing-three-parents?
lite; Ellie Hall, Lesbian Couple and Hairdresser Sperm Donor To All Be Listed on Baby’s
303
   
  
 









   
 
  
         
 
    









   
 
 





unit, the child would still benefit from having the third adult in a parental
role.31  Such a role means the child would have a right to continued contact
with the adult and allows for another adult role model for the child and 
additional economic investors in the child’s higher education.32 
The rule of two legal parents per child does not affect only same-sex 
families.  News articles frequently discuss cases in which states’ parentage
laws are ineffective.33  Consider a New York case in which a man and his
live-in girlfriend decided to have a child together and due to difficulties 
conceiving, used an anonymous sperm donor.34  With the help of in vitro 
fertilization, the couple had a baby boy—Lincoln Amory Aurelian Sporn 
Leutner—in July 2012.35  In mid-December 2012, Ms. Leutner moved out 
of the apartment she shared with Dr. Sporn and committed suicide on 
Birth Certificate, BUZZFEED (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.buzzfeed.com/ellievhall/lesbian-
couple-and-hairdresser-sperm-donor-allowed-to-all-be.  In Florida, a lesbian couple, Ms.
Italiano and Ms. Filippazzo, had difficulty conceiving through the use of fertility clinics.
Hall, supra. They asked their gay friend, Mr. Gerina, to provide his sperm for artificial 
insemination. Id.  He did, and once Ms. Italiano became pregnant, Mr. Gerina refused to 
sign a contract in which he would relinquish all of his parental rights.  Id.  Mr. Gerina 
stated he had made the donation under the impression he would be considered one of the 
child’s parents because the women were looking for a father for the child.  Id.  The couple had
a different idea of Mr. Gerina’s role, which resulted in a two-year paternity battle.  Id.
The three settled the matter in January 2013. Id. A Florida judge approved the settlement and
the adoption of the child, including the child’s new birth certificate, which will list all 
three parents. Id.  The couple will have sole parental rights, even though Florida recognizes 
Mr. Gerina as the child’s father and grants him biweekly visitation rights. Id.  Mr. Gerina will 
not, however, have to make child support payments.  Id.  In an interview with Reuters, 
Ms. Filippazzo said, 
We’re trying to do the right thing for Emma . . . .  We want Emma to have it
all, and we believe by doing it this way, including him in a birthday or 
Thanksgiving, it’ll be a nice addition for her.  We believe the best interest for 
Emma is for him to have a role in her life, but not as a parent . . . . The role is
this is mommy’s good friend who helped your moms have you because they
wanted you so badly.
Gray, supra (internal quotation marks omitted). 
31. Interview with Robert C. Fellmeth, supra note 5. 
32. Id. 
33. See, e.g., Ginia Bellafante, When the Law Says a Parent Isn’t a Parent, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2013, at MB5.  Ms. Bellafante discusses the evolution of the “Modern Family” 
and how the law has lagged behind: 
Gay rights are moving forward; single women now account for 41 percent of
all births.  Americans build caring families with lovers, friends and neighbors;
from one-night stands and anonymous providers of genetic material.  And yet, 
even in a place as progressive as New York, the legal system has been slow to
synchronize to these altered realities.
Id.; see also Lovett, supra note 1, at A9, A13 (referring to the growing legal debate about 
how alternative family arrangements should be legally recognized).
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New Year’s Day.36  Since that time, Lincoln has been in the custody of 
child protective services and is in foster care in New York City.37  Because
the couple was not married and because Dr. Sporn is not Lincoln’s 
biological father, he is not one of Lincoln’s legal parents according to
New York law.38  As a result, Lincoln has the status of destitute, a term
used for children who have no known parents.39  Despite the role Dr. 
Sporn has played in Lincoln’s life thus far, including changing and washing 
him and soothing him back to sleep, he is now engaged in a custody 
battle with Ms. Leutner’s sister.40  Dr. Sporn is effectively a legal stranger to
Lincoln, a child he and Lincoln’s mother intended to create and raise 
together and who shares his name.41 Regardless of one’s opinion on who 
should have custody of Lincoln, it is evident that the rule of two creates 
harsh results. 
To illustrate how quickly parentage is expanding and how necessary it 
is for the law to catch up, consider the United Kingdom’s recent decision 
to become the first country to allow scientists to experiment with a type 
of in vitro fertilization that uses DNA from three people.42  The intended 
purpose of the treatment is to keep a woman with mitochondrial disease 
from passing the disease onto her child.43  Those in support of this
technique emphasize the life-saving possibilities; those opposed fear it 
will “open[] the door to the creation of ‘designer babies.’”44  Whichever
view one holds, this technique will eventually allow for the creation of 
children with three genetic parents. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. (“But from the perspective of the law, a parent in Dr. Sporn’s situation is
effectively not a parent at all.  He was not married to Lincoln’s mother.  He has no blood
relationship to the child.  And he did not take steps to legally adopt him after his birth.”). 
39. Id.; see also Paternity Establishment, N.Y. ST. DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT 
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.childsupport.ny.gov/paternity_establishment.html (last visited
June 8, 2014) (“Paternity establishment is the process of determining the legal father of a 
child.  Every child has a biological father, but if the parents are not married, the child has
no legal father, and the biological father has no rights or responsibilities to the child.”). 
40. Bellafante, supra note 33, at MB5.  The court acknowledged that both homes 
would be suitable for the child.  Id.
41. See Jacobs, supra note 12, at 317. 
42. See Laura Smith-Spark, UK Takes Step Toward ‘Three-Parent Babies,’ CNN 













   
  
 
       
 
 




     
 
   









B. The Marital Presumption and Presumed Parent Status 
Despite the decline in the number of traditional families, courts are 
“constrained by the two-parent paradigm doctrine to ‘fit’ . . . [new family
structures] into old molds.”45  Historically, courts applied the marital 
presumption that the mother’s husband was the father of the child, and in 
the event that the mother was unmarried, the child had only one legal
parent.46  Because genetic testing was not available to determine biological
parenthood, the system relied on marriage.47  With the rise of genetic testing 
and the decline of marriage, courts have increasingly turned to biology to
determine parenthood.48 
45. Jacobs, supra note 12, at 310, 312 (“[W]hen appropriate, we need to recognize
that more than two individuals can assume the many roles and obligations that traditional
parentage has entailed, and children can benefit from the legal recognition of all of those 
individuals as parents.”); cf. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 16 (“The typical 
family is the nuclear family: a mother and father, and kids.  And even this sort of nuclear 
family made up less than half of all ‘families’ by 2000.”). 
46. See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 6 (“Marriage lost its monopoly 
over legitimate sexual behavior.  By the end of the [twentieth] century, there was no such 
thing, legally speaking, as a bastard; children born out of wedlock had more or less the
same rights as children of married parents.  This development was linked to another one, 
which would have startled the good citizens of Victorian America: cohabitation was not 
only legal, it was common as dirt. Sexual freedom had gained both social and legal
acceptance.  Moreover, in some places, gay couples could be recognized as a kind of 
family.”); Baker, supra note 15, at 131 (“Traditionally, marital status determined parental
status and the existence of parental rights was contingent on the state of one’s marriage.”);
Jacobs, supra note 12, at 309–10 (“Determining a child’s legal mother and father was not
historically difficult: the birth mother was the legal mother and her husband, pursuant to 
the marital presumption, was the child’s father.  For a child born out of wedlock, only the
mother was a legal parent.” (citing Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating
Biological and Social Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 816 (2006); David D. Meyer,
Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and Social 
Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 127 (2006))). 
47. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 140 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“In the plurality’s constitutional universe, we may not take notice of the fact that the 
original reasons for the conclusive presumption of paternity are out of place in a world in 
which blood tests can prove virtually beyond a shadow of a doubt who sired a particular 
child and in which the fact of illegitimacy no longer plays the burdensome and stigmatizing 
role it once did.”).  Professor Baker discusses how the marital presumption determined 
legal parent status, how the “importance of marriage” has declined, and how “[w]ithout
the law of marriage, we do not know who parents are.”  Baker, supra note 21, at 651. 
48. See Baker, supra note 21, at 651–53. Professor Baker argues that what makes 
it attractive for courts to focus on biology is not 
so much the importance of the genetic connection between parent and child, 
but is instead the way in which a bionormative regime constructs parenthood
as private (meaning that the state has no legitimate interest in regulating, but 
also no requirement to finance, parenthood), exclusive (meaning one’s parental 
status may not be usurped by anyone else), and binary (meaning there are at
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Presumed parent status is the strongest parental status under the law.49 
There are two avenues to achieving presumed parent status: being married
to the mother before the child’s birth or following the child’s birth, holding 
out the child as your own, living with the child, and functioning as the 
child’s parent.50  When a person establishes parental status, a fundamental 
liberty interest to parent accrues to that person, and the state can take it 
away only by clear and convincing evidence.51 
In California, a woman is presumed to be a child’s natural mother if
she gave birth to the child.52  A man is presumed to be a child’s natural
father if he was married to the child’s mother and living with her at the 
time of the child’s birth.53 Under California’s Uniform Parentage Act, a 
Id. at 653.  In Lincoln’s case, he has only one legal parent because sperm donors are not 
legal parents under New York law.  See Bellafante, supra note 33, at MB5. As a result,
once Lincoln’s mother died, he had no legal parents under the law, even though Dr. 
Sporn had been acting as a father to him.  Id.
49. The term presumed derives from the Federal Uniform Parentage Act.  Lecture 
by Robert C. Fellmeth, Professor & Exec. Dir., Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Children’s 
Advocacy Inst., Child Rights & Remedies, in San Diego, Cal. (Nov. 7, 2012). After
presumed parent status, the following parental statuses apply in order of strongest to
weakest: alleged parent status, “mere” biological parent status, and de facto parent status. 
Id.
50. In Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1217 (Cal. 1992), the California
Supreme Court held that equal protection and due process require that a father of a child 
born out of wedlock, who attempts to obtain custody of the child and rear the child himself, be
allowed to withhold his consent to the child’s adoption by third parties.  Therefore, the
father’s parental rights cannot be terminated absent a showing of his unfitness.  See id.
Note that presumed parent status can apply to men and women.  See Elisa B. v. Superior
Court, 117 P.3d 660, 664–65, 670 (Cal. 2005) (holding that the genetic mother’s former
lesbian partner was the children’s presumed parent by virtue of having “actively
participated” in the artificial insemination process and having cared for the children for
more than a year after their birth such that she was obligated to pay child support). 
51. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646–47, 649 (1972), the United States Supreme 
Court held that the fundamental liberty interest to parent is not based on marriage alone. 
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, parents are 
constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children can be removed 
from their custody. Id. at 649; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982)
(holding that due process requires a state to prove termination of parental rights according to
the clear and convincing evidence standard, rather than the preponderance of the evidence
standard); supra note 8 and accompanying text.
52. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610(a) (West 2014). 
53. Id. § 7540.  Section 7540 of the California Family Code establishes the marital
presumption: “[T]he child of a wife cohabitating with her husband, who is not impotent 
or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.” Id.  Pursuant to section 
7541, however, the child’s mother can challenge the presumed father’s paternity by blood 


























    
  
 










man can establish he is a child’s presumed father by signing a voluntary 
declaration of paternity or receiving the child into his home and openly
holding out the child as his own.54  If a parent has not established parental
status, the legal parent, or parents, can bar the child from having contact 
with the parent who is not legally recognized.55 
Although reliance on biology is helpful, it alone may not be enough
for a man attempting to invoke his parental rights.56  In Lehr v. Robertson, 
the United States Supreme Court first made the “clear distinction between a
mere biological relationship and an actual relationship of parental 
responsibility.”57  Although a “mere biological relationship” between a 
father and child may not be sufficient for a father who is attempting to 
invoke his parental rights, it usually is enough to impose child support
obligations on him.58 
For a biological father who wants to be considered one of a child’s
legal parents, he will have to show he has performed as a parent to the 
child.59  This will then allow him and the child to raise an estoppel
54. Id. §§  7574, 7611(d). 
55. Interview with Robert C. Fellmeth, supra note 5; see also Wald, supra note 
13, at 382 (describing “vicious . . . and unnecessary . . . tugs of war” between legal parents
and parents who are not legally recognized). 
56. See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129–32 (holding that a California law, 
which precluded the child’s biological father from rebutting the marital presumption, did
not violate the biological father’s procedural or substantive due process rights).  Justice 
Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, criticized the Court’s focus on whether there has been
historical protection of a biological father’s “relationship with a child whose mother is
married to another man,” rather than focusing on “whether parenthood is an interest that
historically has received our attention and protection.” Id. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
He goes on to say that the Court’s precedents have held that a biological relationship
between father and child alone does not guarantee the father a constitutional right to a
relationship with the child, but if the father has a biological relationship to the child and
has established a “substantial parent-child relationship” with the child, he is guaranteed 
constitutional protection of the relationship. Id. at 142–43 (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quillion v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246 (1978); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645). 
57. 463 U.S. at 259–60. In Lehr, the Court held that biology creates opportunity 
and the biological father has to seize the opportunity.  Id. at 262. If he does not and the 
other parent has an established custodial relationship with the child, the Equal Protection 
Clause does not prevent a state from according the parents different legal rights. Id. at
267–68.
58. See, e.g., Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 475–76 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)
(holding that equitable estoppel required the sperm donor to make child support payments
because he was involved in the children’s lives).  But see Gray, supra note 30; Hall, supra
note 30 (discussing a case in which a lesbian couple’s gay friend provided his sperm for
artificial insemination and resulted in a Florida court granting him biweekly visitation
rights without requiring him to make child support payments).
59. In Adoption of Kelsey S., the California Supreme Court held that the father of
a child born out of wedlock can withhold his consent to the child’s adoption by third 



























   
 
 
     
 
 
   
 
      
   
[VOL. 51:  295, 2014] A Modern King Solomon’s Dilemma
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
argument—the father has functioned as a father, the child knows him as
a father, and the state should be estopped from declaring that no parent-
child relationship exists.60  However, even a biological relationship between
a father and child and the father’s performance as a parent may be
insufficient to afford legal protection to the relationship.61  As the Court
decided in Michael H. v. Gerald D., states are able to place priorities on
certain institutions, such as marriage, through the use of the marital
presumption.62 
In Michael H., the child had three caregivers: her mother, her mother’s
husband—her presumed father—and her biological father.63  The child had 
lived with both her presumed father and biological father and was seeking
to “maintain[] her filial relationship” with her biological father.64  In holding 
that the California statute precluding the biological father from rebutting 
the marital presumption was constitutional, the Court wrote, “California 
1216, 1217 (Cal. 1992). Therefore, the father’s parental rights cannot be terminated
absent a showing of his unfitness.  Id.
60. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 143 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Michael H. is
almost certainly Victoria D.’s natural father, has lived with her as her father, has contributed
to her support, and has from the beginning sought to strengthen and maintain his relationship 
with her.”); Interview with Robert C. Fellmeth, supra note 5.
61. See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129–32 (plurality opinion). 
62. As a result, the marital presumption trumped the relationship the child and
biological father had formed.  Id. at 129–30.  Because the law restricts children to two
parents, the child’s presumed parent—her mother’s husband—is her one and only legal 
father.  Id. But see id. at 145 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The plurality’s exclusive rather
than inclusive definition of the ‘unitary family’ is out of step with other decisions as
well. This pinched conception of ‘the family,’ crucial as it is in rejecting Michael’s and
Victoria’s claims of a liberty interest, is jarring in light of our many cases preventing the 
States from denying important interests or statuses to those whose situations do not fit 
the government’s narrow view of the family.”).
63. The child’s parents, Carole and Gerald, married in 1976.  Id. at 113 (plurality 
opinion). In 1978, Carole began an affair with Michael. Id.  In 1980, Carole conceived a 
child, Victoria. Id.  Carole informed Michael that she thought he could be Victoria’s father.
Id. at 114. Blood tests confirmed there was a 98.07% probability that Michael was 
Victoria’s father.  Id.  Following that discovery, Carole and Victoria lived with Gerald 
and then later with Michael.  Id.  Both Gerald and Michael held out Victoria to the world 
as his daughter. Id. at 113–14; see also Wald, supra note 13, at 400 (noting that the plurality
included five opinions, indicating how unsettled this area of law is).
64. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114–16, 130.  The Court denied Victoria’s request, 
writing, “Here, to provide protection to an adulterous natural father is to deny protection 
to a marital father, and vice versa.” Id. at 130.  The Court rejected the idea that Victoria
had a substantive due process right to maintain a relationship with her biological father. 
Id. Despite Michael’s biological connection to Victoria and their parent-child relationship,



















    
 
 











   
   
   
law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood.”65  The 
Court rejected the child’s claim that she had a due process right to maintain 
a filial relationship with both her presumed father and biological father: 
“[T]he claim that a State must recognize multiple fatherhood has no support 
in the history or traditions of this country.”66 
As Professor Robert C. Fellmeth, Executive Director of the University 
of San Diego School of Law’s Children’s Advocacy Institute, points out,
this is a self-fulfilling prophecy.67  Multiple fatherhood is actually in the
history and traditions of this country; the law, however, does not reflect 
that.68  Because of the rise in divorce rates, there are many instances of 
multiple parents—biological parents and stepparents—functioning as 
parents to a child.  A child should not be punished by being deprived of a
relationship with, and financial support from, the child’s biological father
by virtue of the child’s mother having had an extramarital affair. 
Despite the decline in marriage and the rise in nonmarital births, all
states still have the marital presumption in some form.69  States vary in 
terms of whether they allow family members to rebut the marital
presumption—present evidence that the mother’s husband is not the child’s
biological father.70  Louisiana is the only state that allows a biological 
father, mother, or child to rebut the marital presumption.71  By allowing
65. Id. at 118. 
66. Id. at 131. But see id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“What the deeply 
rooted traditions of the country are is arguable.” (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 549 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Webster 
v. Ryan, 729 N.Y.S.2d 315, 333 (Fam. Ct. 2001) (discussing Michael H. and highlighting the 
fact that the Supreme Court took eighteen pages to dismiss the biological father’s
constitutional claims and devoted only three paragraphs to the child’s claims).
67. Interview with Robert C. Fellmeth, supra note 5. 
68. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 139–40. Justice Brennan criticized the plurality 
for tailoring the question so narrowly: “[W]hether the specific variety of parenthood
under consideration—a natural father’s relationship with a child whose mother is 
married to another man—has enjoyed [historical] protection.”  Id. at 139. He wrote that 
the Court has recognized certain interests that had not previously been protected and had 
the Court looked to tradition with the level of specificity it did in Michael H., it would
have reached a different result.  Id. (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (arbitrary
transfers from prison to psychiatric institutions); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651
(1977) (use of corporal punishment in schools); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)
(rights of fathers to raise illegitimate children); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) 
(unmarried couples’ use of contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(married couples’ use of contraceptives)); Interview with Robert C. Fellmeth, supra note 5.
69. See Jacobs, supra note 14, at 227. 
70. See id. (citing Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the
Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 234–36
(2006)).
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people to rebut the marital presumption, Louisiana “explicitly provides 
for more than two parents, namely dual fatherhood.”72  The reasoning 
behind the concept of dual paternity in Louisiana is that a child should be 
able to receive financial support from the child’s biological father and 
presumed father.73 
The marital presumption is no longer a sufficient way to determine who a
child’s legal parents are.  As can be the case with an extramarital affair, as
exemplified by Michael H.,74 and especially in the case of a family that 
used ART, there can be more than two people who qualify as a child’s
presumed parents. 
C. The Uniform Parentage Act 
Although there have been some federal statutes in the area, family law 
is essentially the states’ domain.75  One of the few initiatives to reach across 
state lines is the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), a federal statute passed
If the child is presumed to be the child of another man, the action shall be
instituted within one year from the day of the birth of the child. Nevertheless, 
if the mother in bad faith deceived the father of the child regarding his paternity,
the action shall be instituted within one year from the day the father knew or
should have known of his paternity, or within ten years from the day of the birth of
the child, whichever first occurs.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 198 (2014). 
72. Jacobs, supra note 14, at 227.  Professor Jacobs discusses how the Department 
of Public Welfare can also rebut the marital presumption by bringing “an action to
establish the paternity and support obligation of a child’s biological father,” as long as 
the action is in the child’s best interest.  Id. at 227–28 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 46.236.1.2(D) (2005)).
73. See id. at 228 (quoting Dep’t of Soc. Serv. v. Howard, 898 So. 2d 443, 444
(La. Ct. App. 2004)). 
74. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
75. See  GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 21 (“There is, in the United 
States, as Mary Ann Glendon notes, no cabinet minister ‘charged with responsibility for
family affairs,’ nor an ‘explicit national family policy,’ as there is in some other countries.” 
















    
 
   
  










   
   
   
 
 
by Congress in 1973.76  To date, twenty-one states have enacted statutes 
similar to the Federal UPA.77 
At the state level, California has led in the area of family law.78  In 1993, 
the California Supreme Court in Johnson v. Calvert discussed legal issues
that had developed due to the advent of ART.79  The Johnson court 
discussed the UPA, which was enacted to have legitimate and illegitimate 
children treated equally under the law.80  Instead of focusing on the marital 
status of a child’s parents to determine the rights of the parents and 
child, the UPA focuses on the existence of a parent-child relationship.81 
The California UPA defines parent and child relationship as “the legal
relationship existing between a child and the child’s natural or adoptive 
parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, 
duties, and obligations.”82  This legal relationship is afforded to every parent
and child regardless of whether the child’s parents are married.83  Thus, 
the empirical grounding of the UPA is not consistent with a bright-line, 
two-parent absolute.84 
76. Id. at 296.  The UPA was first proposed in response to state bills calling for
the prohibition of donors in the area of ART. Id.  The UPA, which was revised in 2002, 
provides that an anonymous sperm donor is not the legal father of the child; rather, the 
mother’s husband is the child’s legal father. Id. (citing UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 
(amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 407 (1973)). 
77. Some version of the UPA has been enacted in twenty-one states. ANN 
HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE, AND ADOPTION CASES § 3:5 (2012). 
Twelve states have adopted some or all of the 1973 provisions of the UPA, including
California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, 
New Jersey, Ohio, and Rhode Island. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600–7730 (West 2014). 
78. See Steven K. Berenson, The Elkins Legislation: Will California Change Family 
Law Again?, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 443, 443 (2012).
79. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).  The court addressed this question: “When, pursuant to a
surrogacy agreement, a zygote formed of the gametes of a husband and wife is implanted
in the uterus of another woman, who carries the resulting fetus to term and gives birth to
a child not genetically related to her, who is the child’s ‘natural mother’ under California 
law?” Id. at 777–78 (footnotes omitted). 
80. Id. at 778–79 (explaining that the UPA was adopted following United States
Supreme Court decisions in which the Court mandated legitimate and illegitimate
children be treated equally).  Those decisions include Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 
(1968), and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 391 U.S. 73 
(1968). Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779.  In her article, Professor Jacobs discusses the UPA,
which she says provided “a mechanism” such that courts would find two legal parents
for each child, regardless of the marital status of the child’s parents.  Jacobs, supra note 
14, at 225. 
81. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7602 (West 2014); Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779. 
82. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7601.
83. In California, the specific code section states, “The parent and child relationship
extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the
parents.” Id. § 7602. 
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In Johnson, the surrogate mother, Anna, gave birth to a child created 
through in vitro fertilization by the genetic mother, Crispina, and her 
husband, Mark Calvert.85  Anna argued that she was the child’s legal mother
by virtue of having given birth to the child pursuant to California Civil 
Code section 7003,86 which stated that the parent and child relationship
“may be established by proof of having given birth to the child.”87 
Crispina’s claim that she was the child’s legal mother was based on her 
genetic connection to the child.88 
In declining to find that the child had two mothers, the court wrote, 
“[F]or any child California law recognizes only one natural mother.”89 The
court reasoned that because the Calverts were the “genetic and intending 
parents” of the child, it would diminish Crispina’s role as mother to 
recognize parental rights in Anna, a person with whom the Calverts had
little contact following the child’s birth.90  Discussing a situation in which 
the genetic mother and the woman who gave birth to the child are not the 
same person, the court focused on intent: “[S]he who intended to procreate 
the child—that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that
she intended to raise as her own—is the natural mother under California 
law.”91 
85. First names of parties used to avoid confusion. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778. For 
additional background, see Dan Chu, Nancy Matsumoto & Lorenzo Benet, A Judge Ends
a Wrenching Surrogacy Dispute, Ruling that Three Parents for One Baby Is One Mom
Too Many, PEOPLE WEEKLY, Nov. 5, 1990, at 143. 
86. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779 
87. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610.  California Civil Code section 7003 was repealed
and replaced by California Family Code section 7610.  No changes in substance were 
made to the law. Id.
88. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779–80. 
89. Id. at 781.  The court continued by writing that this is the case “despite advances in
reproductive technology rendering a different outcome biologically possible.”  Id.
90. Id. at 781 & n.8 (“[W]hile gestation may demonstrate maternal status, it is not
the sine qua non of motherhood.”). 
91. Id. at 782. The court rejected the argument made by amicus curiae, the 
American Civil Liberties Union, that the court should find that the child has two 
mothers. Id. at 781 n.8.  The court wrote, “Even though rising divorce rates have made 
multiple parent arrangements common in our society, we see no compelling reason to 
recognize such a situation here.”  Id.  The court went on to write that finding that the 
child had three parents was not necessary because the child’s two genetic parents
intended to create the child. Id. at 782.  This raises the question of how many parents a 






























1. The Importance of Conduct and Intent 
Under the UPA, a child’s legal father can be either the child’s biological 
or social father.92  In the case of an egg or sperm donor, the UPA provides
that a donor is not a legal parent: “[A] donor is not a parent of a child
conceived by means of assisted reproduction.”93  The UPA further provides
that a surrogate is not a legal parent: “[T]he prospective gestational mother
and the donors relinquish all rights and duties as parents of a child
conceived through assisted reproduction.”94 
As the UPA recognizes, marriage and biology are not the only factors 
courts look to when deciding who a child’s legal parents are.95  The Act
acknowledges, as case law has, that biology is too broad, and marriage is 
too narrow.96  This is the problem with having a bright-line rule limiting 
parenthood to two people.97 Instead, courts should focus on criteria that
are based on reality, such as conduct and intent, and their application of 
those criteria should be on a case-by-case basis.98  As courts increasingly 
look to conduct and intent, rather than only marriage and biology, they
will continue to see that “there may be more than two people who are 
candidates for the legal title ‘parent.’”99  However, the legal title parent
has been limited to two people per child, even when a court finds that
more than two people have standing to establish legal parentage.100 
In 2005, the California Supreme Court looked to conduct and intent
when it held in Elisa B. v. Superior Court that a former lesbian partner 
of a woman with children was the children’s presumed mother under the 
92. See Jacobs, supra note 12, at 318 (“[T]he Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) was 
promulgated to equalize the rights of nonmarital and marital children and provide that 
nonmarital children have two legal parents to provide emotional and financial support.”). 
93. Id. at 322 n.73 (quoting UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (amended 2002), 9B 
U.L.A. 355 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
94. Id. at 322 n.74 (quoting UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801 (amended 2002), 9B 
U.L.A. 362 (2000)). 
95. See id. at 322–24 (discussing how under the UPA, egg and sperm donors and
surrogates are not legal parents, which helps intending parents ensure they are the child’s 
legal parents). 
96. Interview with Robert C. Fellmeth, supra note 5. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Wald, supra note 13, at 381 (discussing courts’ reluctance to find that a child
has more than two legal parents and that when determining who a child’s legal parents 
are, the child’s best interest is not considered in the decision and not achieved in reality).
100. See, e.g., In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 861, 877 (Ct. App. 2011); see also 
Wald, supra note 13, at 381 (“[E]ven when courts find that three or more adults have 
standing to seek parentage, the outcome of such cases still tends to protect the child’s 
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UPA and was therefore required to pay child support.101  The former partner
“actively assisted” the mother “in becoming pregnant with the expressed
intention of enjoying the rights and accepting the responsibilities of parenting
the resulting children. She accepted those obligations and enjoyed those 
rights for years.”102  Because the former partner lived with the children
and held out the children to the world as her own, the court concluded
she was a presumed mother and was therefore obligated to support the
children financially.103 
101. 117 P.3d 660, 662 (Cal. 2005).  The court noted that no one had filed a 
competing claim to the former partner being the children’s second parent.  Id. at 670. 
This suggests that had someone filed a competing claim, the court may not have found
the former partner to be the children’s second legal parent.  This point also highlights the
fact that courts prefer to find that a child has two parents, rather than one.  By attempting
to ensure every child has two parents, this necessarily raises the possibility that more
than two people have claims of legal parentage. This then leads to the question of why
courts limit the number of legal parents to two.  If marriage and biology are no longer the 
exclusive factors courts look to when determining parentage and as courts continue to
look to conduct and intent, there will continue to be more than two people with valid 
claims of legal parentage. 
This case also highlights the fact that courts have not restricted the limit of two to 
couples of the opposite sex. Here, the children’s two legal parents were women.  Had
the children been conceived naturally instead of through the use of ART, there would
have been two biological parents, two or three intending parents, and two or three people 
acting as parents to the children.  If all three intended to create and raise the children, it 
leads to the question of why legal parentage should be limited to two people.  Id. at 670–71. 
102. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 669.  The women, Elisa and Emily, were both artificially
inseminated. Id. at 663.  They used the sperm of the same sperm donor. Id. During their
pregnancies, they attended each other’s medical appointments and childbirth classes.  Id.
Elisa gave birth to a boy, and Emily gave birth to twins.  Id.  They breastfed all of the
children and joined their last names to create the children’s last names.  Id.  When the 
couple separated, Elisa raised her son on her own, and Emily began raising the twins
alone. See id. Emily brought this action seeking child support from Elisa. See id. at 662.
The court quoted the legislature regarding the purpose of establishing paternity:
“Establishing paternity is the first step toward a child support award, which, in turn, 
provides children with equal rights and access to benefits, including, but not limited to, 
social security, health insurance, survivors’ benefits, military benefits, and inheritance
rights.”  Id. at 669 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 7570(a) (West 1993)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The court went on to note that the legislature, in recognizing the importance 
of determining paternity, “implicitly recognized the value of having two parents, rather
than one, as a source of both emotional and financial support, especially when the obligation
to support the child would otherwise fall to the public.”  Id.
 103. Id. at 670. Had the court not held the former partner responsible for paying 
child support, the children would have been entitled to financial support from only one 
legal parent—their biological mother.  The couple used a sperm donor, and under the 
law, sperm donors are not legal parents.  To ensure the children were not disadvantaged
by the fact that they were created through the use of ART, the court held that the former
315
  
   
 
 









    





    
    
   






2. The American Law Institute 
Like the UPA, which has evolved as family forms have changed, the
American Law Institute suggests that three types of parents exist: “legal 
parents, parents by estoppel, and de facto parents.”104 A person is a legal
parent through either biology or adoption, as determined by state law.105 
A parent by estoppel is someone who, with the legal parent’s agreement, 
has lived with the child for at least two years and has “assumed full
parenting responsibilities.”106 Courts treat those who qualify as parents by
estoppel the same as they treat legal parents.107  A de facto parent is
someone who, with the legal parent’s consent or due to the legal parent’s 
failure to meet the child’s needs, has cared for the child on a regular 
basis.108 
Unlike a presumed father, who may claim he is the child’s biological 
father, a de facto father is not the child’s biological father but functions 
as a parent to the child, such as a foster father.109  A de facto parent is
short of a presumed parent in terms of the rights each has, but as far as
the child is concerned, a de facto parent is “mom” or “dad.”110  The rights of
de facto parents are constantly in flux and evolving statutorily and 
partner was obligated to make child support payments. Id. at 669.  In the event more 
than two people seek to be declared a child’s legal parents, there is no risk that the child
is going to be deprived of financial support from one of the parents.  In fact, it is the 
exact opposite. These people are going to court asking to be declared the child’s legal
parents. If the court gives legal parent status to more than two people for any given 
child, those people will have parental rights with respect to the child, including custody 
and visitation rights, and will also be required to contribute to the child’s financial 
support. Id. at 669–70. 
104. See Jacobs, supra note 12, at 323 (citing AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1) (2002)).
The American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution are “a
comprehensive set of rules and principles on property rights in family breakups that it 
urges states to import into law.”  GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 138 (citing 
AM. LAW INST., supra).
105. See Jacobs, supra note 12, at 323 (citing AM. LAW INST., supra note 104, 
§ 2.03(1)(a)).
106. See id. (citing AM. LAW INST., supra note 104, § 2.03(1)(b)). 
107. See id. at 334 (citing AM. LAW INST., supra note 104, § 2.03(1)(b)). 
108. See id. at 323 (citing AM. LAW INST., supra note 104, § 2.03(1)(c)); see also
Webster v. Ryan, 729 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316 (Fam. Ct. 2001) (holding that the child had a
constitutional right to maintain a relationship with his de facto parent).  Professor 
Fellmeth calls Webster “the ultimate pro-child opinion.”  Interview with Robert C. Fellmeth, 
supra note 5.
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judicially.111  Giving rights to de facto parents recognizes the estoppel
and child reliance elements involved in these situations.112  Because the 
American Law Institute recognizes parents by estoppel and de facto parents,
it addresses the possibility of courts finding that a child has more than
two legal parents.113 
D. Rights and Responsibilities of Third Parties 
Some states, such as Pennsylvania, recognize that a child can have more 
than two people who have the rights and responsibilities of parents,
including custody of the child and child support obligations.114  However, 
few states explicitly recognize three legal parents.115 
In Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, a Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the 
trial court’s custody order, which granted a mother’s former lesbian partner 
primary physical custody of one of the children with partial physical 
111. Id.  De facto parents have the right to appear before the court to discuss the 
child, object during hearings, and present evidence.  Lecture by Robert C. Fellmeth,
supra note 49. 
112.  Interview with Robert C. Fellmeth, supra note 5.
 113. See Jacobs, supra note 12, at 323, 334 (citing AM. LAW INST., supra note 104, 
§ 2.03(1)(b)); David D. Meyer, Partners, Care Givers, and Constitutional Substance of 
Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 47, 47, 51 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 
2006).
114. See Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 475–76 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)
(requiring the sperm donor to make child support payments based on equitable estoppel
because he was involved in the children’s lives); Jacobs, supra note 12, at 327 (“[T]here 
are a number of cases in which courts have protected a child’s relationship with more
than two parental figures.  The cases are sparse, however, and generally reinforce a two 
parent paradigm coupled with rights for a third party and do not afford full parental 
recognition to all three parties.”); Gray, supra note 30; Hall, supra note 30 (discussing a
Florida case in which the court granted the sperm donor biweekly visitation rights 
without requiring him to make child support payments); see also  CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7612(c) (West 2014) (allowing courts to find that a child has more than two legal 
parents); Jacobs, supra note 14, at 227–28 (discussing Louisiana’s civil code, which 
specifically provides for dual fatherhood). 
115. See Jacobs, supra note 12, at 327 (discussing cases in which courts granted
parental rights to more than two parents but stopped short of finding that the child had
three legal parents); Bellafante, supra note 33, at MB5 (describing the child’s placement 
in foster care because the mother’s boyfriend is not biologically related to the child and 
was not married to the child’s mother, despite the fact that he had acted as a parent to the 
child).
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custody to the biological mother.116  The order also granted primary 
physical custody of the other three children to the mother with partial
physical custody to the former partner and partial physical custody to the 
sperm donor of two of the children.117  The court held that the sperm 
donor was an indispensable party in the child support action and remanded
the case for the trial court to recalculate the child support obligations of
both the sperm donor and former partner.118 
The court essentially found that two of the children had three legal 
parents: the mother, former partner, and sperm donor all had at least partial 
physical custody of the children, and both the former partner and sperm 
donor were required to pay child support.119  The sperm donor was present 
for one of the children’s births, had provided financial support to the 
children since their births, contributed more than $13,000 to them in the 
four years preceding the case, and encouraged the children to call him
“Papa.”120 In holding two people obligated to contribute to the children’s
support, the court wrote, “We are not convinced that the calculus of support 
arrangements cannot be reformulated . . . .”121 
Other states, such as Maine, have not gone as far but have given de
facto parent status to nonbiological parents.122  In C.E.W. v. D.E.W., the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the superior court’s ruling,
which found that the mother’s former lesbian partner was the child’s de
facto parent and was therefore “entitled to be considered for an award of 
116. 923 A.2d at 476, 482.  The lesbian couple lived together for nine years before 
entering into a civil union. Id. at 476.  One of the women asked her longtime friend to be
their sperm donor.  Id.  Since the children’s birth, the sperm donor has been involved in
their lives. Id.
 117. Id.
 118. Id. at 482 (“[R]ather than remaining detached from the children, he became, 
voluntarily, indeed, enthusiastically, an integral part of their lives.”).
119. Id. at 476, 482.  The biological father was awarded one weekend a month with 
his two children. Id. at 476. As for child support, the trial court had decided not to hold 
the biological father responsible because it would result in three parents being liable for
the children’s financial support. Id. at 482.  The appellate court did not agree with this 
reasoning and cited L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872, 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), in support 
of its view:
We recognize this is a matter which is better addressed by the legislature 
rather than the courts. However, in the absence of legislative mandates, the 
courts must construct a fair, workable and responsible basis for the protection 
of children, aside from whatever rights the adults may have vis a vis each other. 
Jacob, 923 A.2d at 476, 482. 
District of Columbia also provide for de facto parent status and do so by statute.  See 
120. Id. at 481. 
121. Id. at 482. 
122. See C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1152 (Me. 2004).  Delaware and the 
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parental rights and responsibilities.”123  The former partner was not related 
to the child but had parented the child with the mother since birth, and 
the mother had conceded that her former partner was the child’s de facto
parent.124  In reviewing the case, the court applied the “best interest of 
the child” standard and cautioned that de facto parent status “must surely
be limited to those adults who have fully and completely undertaken a 
permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the 
child’s life.”125 
E. Recognition of Three—or More—Legal Parents
Canada has directly recognized that a child can have three legal parents.126 
In A.A. v. B.B., the Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a declaration that 
the biological mother’s lesbian partner was a legal parent, in addition to 
the child’s two biological parents.127  The biological mother and her partner
decided to have a child and did so with the help of their friend, the
biological father.128  All three agreed that the women would be the child’s
123.  845 A.2d at 1146–47. 
124. Id. at 1147. The women agreed that one of them would become pregnant by
artificial insemination. Id.  They changed their last names so they would have the same
last name as the child.  Id.  They also signed an agreement in which they expressed their
desire to share equally their parental rights and responsibilities. Id.  Upon their separation,
they signed a second agreement outlining their decision to share the parental rights and
responsibilities for the child equally. Id.  The woman who has no biological connection 
to the child filed a complaint seeking a declaration of her parental rights and responsibilities
and to equitably estop the biological mother from denying her status as one of the child’s 
parents. Id. at 1147–48. 
125. Id. at 1149, 1152 (“D.E.W. concedes that C.E.W. is the child’s de facto
parent, has accepted C.E.W.’s parental role in two written agreements, and has not
challenged on appeal the court’s conclusion that C.E.W. is the child’s de facto parent.”); 
see also GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 5–6 (discussing the advent of the child 
“best interests” rule at the end of the nineteenth century).
126.  A.A. v. B.B. (2007), 220 O.C.A. 115, para. 1 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
127. Id. para. 41. The court addressed some of the points made by the child’s 
lawyer and intervenors, specifically regarding the rights that come with a legally 
recognized parent-child relationship.  Id. para. 14. First, the status of legal parent is 
lifelong and immutable and ensures the parent can fully participate in the child’s life.  Id.
Second, in the event of the parent’s death, the child will be able to inherit on intestacy.
Id. Third, the parent can obtain a health insurance card, a social insurance number, and a
passport for the child, as well as enroll the child in school. Id.  In the event the 
biological parent dies, the partner could not make decisions for the child.  Id. para. 15. 
128. Id. para. 1.
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primary caregivers, but the women believed it would be in their son’s 
best interest to have his biological father involved in his life.129 
Two years after the child’s birth, the biological mother’s partner sought a
declaration that, like the biological mother and father, she was the child’s
parent, specifically, his mother.130  The partner did not pursue an adoption
order because doing so would result in the biological father losing his
status as one of the child’s legal parents.131  In finding a gap in the
legislation, as the legislature had not contemplated same-sex unions and
the advances in ART at the time of the Act’s passing, the court applied 
its parens patriae jurisdiction and declared that the partner was a mother 
of the child because it would be contrary to the child’s best interest if he 
was “deprived of the legal recognition of the parentage of one of his 
mothers.”132 
III. CALIFORNIA SENATE BILL 1476 AND CALIFORNIA 
SENATE BILL 274 
A. California Senate Bill 1476 
Courts are reluctant to expand rights in the absence of a statute.133 
This is the case for courts considering the recognition of more than two 
legal parents.134 
129. Id.
 130. Id. para. 2. The application judge did not think he had the authority to make 
the declaration that the biological mother’s partner sought.  Id. para. 3. As a result, he 
dismissed the application. Id. If he had thought he had the authority to make the 
declaration, he would have: 
The child is a bright, healthy, happy individual who is obviously thriving in a 
loving family that meets his every need.  The applicant has been a daily and 
consistent presence in his life.  She is fully committed to a parental role.  She
has the support of the two biological parents who themselves recognize her
equal status with them. 
Id. para. 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
131. Id. para. 13.  The court commented that this would not be in the child’s best 
interests: “It is contrary to D.D.’s best interests that he is deprived of the legal recognition of
the parentage of one of his mothers.” Id. para. 37. 
132. Id. paras. 34–35, 37.  Parens patriae is a Latin term meaning “parent of his or
her country.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009).  The term’s definition is 
“[t]he state regarded as a sovereign; the state in its capacity as provider of protection to 
those unable to care for themselves.” Id.
 133. See Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It Is the “Right”
Thing To Do, 27 PACE L. REV. 869, 888 (2007). 
134. See, e.g., In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 861, 877 (Ct. App. 2011).
Although the court acknowledged that the statutory framework, the UPA, is out of date, 
the court was hesitant to uphold the juvenile court’s finding in the absence of statutory
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In February 2010, a Los Angeles dependency court commissioner found 
that the child M.C. had three presumed parents: “a biological presumed 
mother, a statutorily presumed mother and a constitutionally presumed
father under Adoption of Kelsey S.”135  The California Court of Appeal,
when discussing the juvenile court’s finding, wrote, “Increasingly, as aptly 
illustrated here, the complicated pattern of human relations and changing 
familial patterns gives rise to more than one legitimate claimant to the status
of presumed parent, and the juvenile court must resolve the competing 
claims.”136 
In reversing the juvenile court’s finding, the Court of Appeal noted 
that the facts of the case made it an inappropriate instance in which to find 
that the child had three presumed parents and that even if it was appropriate, 
“[s]uch important policy determinations, which will profoundly impact
families, children and society, are best left to the Legislature.”137  The court, 
however, acknowledged the issues M.C. and amicus curiae had raised,
particularly “the inadequacies of the antiquated UPA to accommodate
rapidly changing familial structures, and the need to recognize and
accommodate novel parenting relationships.”138 The court, impliedly critical
of the statutory two-parent limit, noted that “these issues are critical, and
California’s existing statutory framework is ill-equipped to resolve 
them.”139 
Although the juvenile court’s finding was correct, the Court of Appeal 
held that the trial court erred by failing to resolve the “competing 
135. Id. at 866–67 (citing Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992)). 
136. Id. at 869 (“[A]lthough more than one individual may fulfill the statutory
criteria that give rise to a presumption of paternity, ‘there can be only one presumed
father.’” (quoting In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 11 (Cal. 2004) (internal quotation marks 
omitted))). 
137. Id. at 870, 878.  The court acknowledged that the California Supreme Court
“has yet to decide ‘whether there exists an overriding legislative policy limiting a child 
to two parents.’” Id. at 870 (quoting Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 666 n.4 
(Cal. 2005)).  However, the court noted that the court “has rejected the concept of dual 
paternity or maternity where such recognition would result in three parents.” Id.; see
also Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781–82 (Cal. 1993) (holding that the genetic
mother of the child was the child’s legal mother because she intended to procreate and 
raise the child, despite the presumed parent status afforded to the surrogate mother by
virtue of her having given birth to the child). 
138. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 869. 















   
 




      
  
   
   







    
 
  
presumptions” such that only two of them had legal parent status.140  The
court remanded the case to the juvenile court to resolve the presumptions
according to the prescribed standard: “the presumption which on the facts is
founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.”141 
On February 24, 2012, in response to the decision in In re M.C., 
Senator Mark Leno of San Francisco introduced Senate Bill 1476 (SB 
1476), which proposed giving courts the discretion to find that a child 
has more than two legal parents after determining such a finding would
be in the child’s best interest.142  Courts would be able to recognize as a
child’s third legal parent only a person who qualifies as a presumed
parent.143 The bill was narrow because only a few people can acquire
presumed parent status for a particular child.
Among other factors for determining a child’s best interest under SB 
1476, courts would consider “the nature, duration, and quality of the 
presumed or claimed parents’ relationships with the child and the benefit 
or detriment to the child in continuing those relationships.”144  A court  
would allocate custody and visitation among parents according to the 
child’s best interest, including the child’s stability.145  In terms of child 
support, the court would divide the child support obligations among the 
140. Id. at 877 (“While we empathize with the desire to leave all options open, 
particularly in a case such as this in which, at least at the time the parentage determination
was made, no available choice was optimal, that conclusion was improper.”). 
141. Id. at 877, 878 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b) (West 2011)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
142. See Introduced Bill Text, S.B. 1476 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 2011–12
Sess. (Cal. 2012), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_1451-1500/sb
_1476 _bill_20120224_introduced.html.  When considering a child’s best interest, California 
courts analyze these factors:
(a) The health, safety, and welfare of the child. (b) Any history of abuse by one
parent or any other person seeking custody . . . .  (c) The nature and amount of
contact with both parents . . . .  (d) The habitual or continual illegal use of
controlled substances, the habitual or continual abuse of alcohol, or the habitual 
or continual abuse of prescribed controlled substances by either parent.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 2014); see also id. § 3020 (declaring that a court, when 
making a best interest determination in the custody and visitation settings, must be 
primarily concerned with a child’s “health, safety, and welfare”).
143. See Introduced Bill Text, S.B. 1476, supra note 142. Under the California 
UPA, a man is presumed to be a child’s natural father
if he is the husband of the child’s mother, is not impotent or sterile, and was 
cohabitating with her (§ 7540); if he signs a voluntary declaration of paternity
stating he is the ‘biological father of the child’ (§ 7574 subd. (b)(6)); and if ‘[h]e 
receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural 
child’ (§ 7611, subd. (d)). 
Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 664, 670 (Cal. 2005) (citing CAL. FAM. CODE
§§ 7540 (West 1994), 7574(b)(6) (West 2000), 7611(d) (West 1994)). 
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parents according to the statewide uniform guidelines.146  Each parent
would pay child support according to income and amount of time spent 
with the child.147 
The Senate and the Assembly passed the bill before Governor Brown 
vetoed it on September 30, 2012.148  In his veto message, Governor Brown 
wrote, “I am sympathetic to the author’s interest in protecting children.
But I am troubled by the fact that some family law specialists believe the 
bill’s ambiguities may have unintended consequences.  I would like to
take more time to consider all of the implications of this change.”149  The
media and some interests groups had thrust SB 1476 into the culture 
war.150  This was likely due, in part, to the fact that the author of the bill, 
Senator Leno, is gay.151  Even though the proposed law would have affected
146. See id.  The statewide uniform guidelines begin with California Family Code 
section 4050. See CAL. DEP’T OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVS., CHILD SUPPORT HANDBOOK 11
(2012), available at http://www.childsup.ca.gov/portals/0/resources/docs/pub160_english.pdf. 
147. This is already the current practice. See CAL. DEP’T OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVS.,
supra note 146. According to California Family Code section 4053, “[t]he guideline 
takes into account each parent’s actual income and level of responsibility for the 
children.”  CAL. FAM. CODE § 4053(c) (West 2014); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7570(b)
(“A simple system allowing for establishment of voluntary paternity will result in a significant 
increase in the ease of establishing paternity, a significant increase in paternity establishment,
an increase in the number of children who have greater access to child support and other 
benefits, and a significant decrease in the time and money required to establish paternity 
due to the removal of the need for a lengthy and expensive court process to determine 
and establish paternity and is in the public interest.”); Introduced Bill Text, S.B. 1476, 
supra note 142; Jacobs, supra note 14, at 223 (“[T]he primary parents who engage in the 
bulk of daily responsibility for the child—and often have the most benefit from the close 
contact—should have greater rights and responsibility regarding the raising of the child
than a third—or fourth—parent who contributes less, or no, financial support and less 
emotional support and has a more tenuous relationship with the child.”). 
148. See Bill History, SB-1476 Family Law: Parentage, CAL. LEGIS. INFO., http:// 
leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_1451-1500/sb_1476_bill_20120930_history.html (last 
visited June 8, 2014). 
149. See Governor’s Veto Message, Bill Status, SB-1476 Family Law: Parentage, CAL.
LEGIS. INFO. (Sept. 30, 2012), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_1451-1500/
sb_1476_vt_20120930.html. 
150. Interview with Robert C. Fellmeth, supra note 5. Radio personality Rush
Limbaugh commented on SB 1476: “This guy’s bill says, okay, we’ll find a way if all three
involved here can come to an agreement, then the child will have three parents. . . . I
don’t know that the bill legalizes polygamy.  I think this is more like assignation of rights.”
Bill To Allow for More than Two Parents, RUSH LIMBAUGH SHOW (July 2, 2012), http://www. 
rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2012/07/02/bill_to_allow_for_more_than_two_parents. 
151. See Biography, SENATOR MARK LENO, http://sd11.senate.ca.gov/biography
(last visited June 8, 2014); Michael Gryboski, Calif. Governor Vetoes Bill Stating Child
Can Have More than Two Parents, CHRISTIAN POST (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.Christian
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same-sex couples, the proposal is not strictly a gay rights issue; it is a 
children’s rights issue.152  
B. California Senate Bill 274 
On October 4, 2013, Governor Brown signed California Senate Bill 
274 (SB 274) into law.153 SB 1476 and SB 274, though “substantially
similar,”154 contain different language: SB 1476 would have allowed courts 
to find that a child has more than two legal parents if such a finding was 
in the child’s best interest; SB 274, now California Family Code section
7612(c), allows courts to find that a child has more than two legal parents if
finding that a child has fewer parents “would be detrimental to the child.”155 
post.com/news/calif-governor-vetoes-bill-stating-child-can-have-more-than-two-parents-
82519/ (“We fully expect a bill of this type to return, as there are several homosexual
legislators and special interest groups with clear intent to deconstruct traditions of 
marriage and parenting . . . .” (quoting Ron Prentice, CEO of the California Family
Council) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
152. Interview with Robert C. Fellmeth, supra note 5. The Children’s Advocacy
Institute at the University of San Diego School of Law co-sponsored SB 1476.  Press 
Release, Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights, CA Governor Brown Vetoes Bill that Would 
Protect Children with More than Two Parents (Sept. 30, 2012), available at http:// 
www.nclrights.org/press-room/press-release/ca-governor-brown-vetoes-bill-that-would-
protect-children-with-more-than-two-parents/. The Children’s Advocacy Institute’s
lobbyist in Sacramento, Ed Howard, commented on Governor Brown’s veto of SB 1476: 
“Until this law gets changed, judges in California will be forced to issue rulings they
know will hurt children by bluntly ordering an end to their real relationships with their
real parents. This is wrong and it should not endure.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
153. See Patrick McGreevy, Brown Signs Bill Allowing Children More than Two
Legal Parents, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2013, 6:36 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/ 
la-me-pc-cal-governor-signs-bill-allowing-children-more-than-two-legal-parents-201310 
04,0,7519412.story. 
154. Bill Analysis, S.B. 274 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2013), 
available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml. 
155. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2014) (directing the courts, when
making detriment determinations, to “consider all relevant factors, including, but not 
limited to, the harm of removing the child from a stable placement with a parent who has
fulfilled the child’s physical needs and the child’s psychological needs for care and 
affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period of time”).  Compare
Bill Analysis, S.B. 274, supra note 154 (focusing on whether finding that a child has only
two legal parents would be “detrimental” to the child, a standard derived from CAL. FAM. 
CODE section 3041 (West 2013) (custody award to nonparent)), with Introduced Bill Text, 
S.B. 1476, supra note 142 (focusing on the child’s best interest).  
Another interesting difference between SB 1476 and SB 274 is SB 274’s amendment 
to California Family Code section 8617, which now provides that birth parents and 
adoptive parents can waive the termination of the birth parents’ parental rights, which
normally would occur upon the child’s adoption. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8617(b) (West
2014). Also of note is the fact that SB 274 and Assembly Bill 1403 were presented as a 
package in that one would be enacted only so long as the other one was also enacted. 
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SB 1476 was narrow in that a parent had to qualify as a presumed parent
before the court would go to the next step of determining whether 
recognition of that third parent was in the child’s best interest.  SB 274 
was also narrow because the court will first have to determine whether
the parent is a presumed parent.156  The second step, however, will require
the court to look at the problem from a different angle.  Instead of being
able to find that a child has more than two legal parents because that
result would be in the child’s best interest, the court is able to make such
a finding only if not making it would be detrimental to the child.  One could
argue these are different standards, but a court’s application of these two
standards would likely lead to the same results.  Senator Leno acknowledges 
as much: “[I]t appears as though applying a ‘detriment’ standard would
be functionally similar to the analysis a court would have undertaken for 
SB 1476.”157 
Governor Brown’s representatives have not commented on the reasons
for his change in position.158  The different language of SB 274 may have 
had something to do with it.  SB 274’s language may have made it easier
for the legislators to believe the law would apply to a smaller subset of the 
population than SB 1476—children who have more than two presumed
parents and would experience detriment if all of their presumed parents 
were not afforded legal parent status.  The additional support for the bill 
likely also played a role.159 
the day before he signed SB 274. See Bill History, AB-1403 Family Law, CAL. LEGIS. 
INFO., http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_1451-1500/sb_1476_bill_20120930_hist
ory.html (last visited June 8, 2014).  Among AB 1403’s amendments is the new definition of
natural parent in Family Code section 7601: “[A] nonadoptive parent established under 
this part, whether biologically related to the child or not.” Today’s Law as Amended,
AB-1403 Family Law, CAL. LEGIS. INFO., http://leginfo.legislature.ca. gov/faces/billTextClient. 
xhtml (last visited June 8, 2014). 
156. See S.B. 274 (section 1(c) of the legislature’s findings states that “[t]his bill 
does not change any of the requirements for establishing a claim to parentage under the 
Uniform Parentage Act”).
157. Bill Analysis, S.B. 274, supra note 154 (noting that there was confusion over 
whether SB 1476 required courts to apply “a standard ‘best interests’ analysis or the 
heightened, ‘as required to serve the best interests’ analysis”).
158. McGreevy, supra note 153. 
159. SB 274 had the support of the following groups: the Children’s Advocacy
Institute, National Center for Lesbian Rights, Association of Family Conciliation Courts, 
California Alliance, Equality California, Legal Services for Children, Our Family
Coalition, Public Counsel, American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, and Wald and 
Thorndal P.C. See Bill Analysis, S.B. 274 Before the S. Rules Comm., 2013–14 Sess.
(Cal. 2013), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml. 
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Another possible reason for Governor Brown’s changed position is the 
United States Supreme Court’s actions on June 26, 2013.  On that date, 
the Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act on equal protection 
grounds in United States v. Windsor and did not rule on a Proposition 8
challenge on standing grounds in Hollingsworth v. Perry, thereby allowing 
gay marriage to resume in California.160  Gay marriages in California
resumed on June 28, 2013, after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals lifted 
the stay on the lower court’s ruling, which had overturned Proposition 8.161 
Even though the Court’s ruling in Hollingsworth affects only California,
the arguments in support of expanding legal parentage to more than two 
people apply to all states.  Thirteen states and the District of Columbia
recognize gay marriage.162  The gay and lesbian couples in these states will 
continue to have families, and given the legal recognition of their marriages,
it will be difficult for the states to argue that these families’ parent-child 
relationships should not be legally recognized based on the idea that 
children should have only two legal parents.  The reality for these families 
is that more than two people are required to bring a child into existence. 
Thus, when a couple chooses to procreate with someone who will be active
in the child’s life, the child should be able to have the state recognize 
that person as a legal parent. 
160. Pete Williams & Erin McClam, Supreme Court Strikes Down Defense of
Marriage Act, Paves Way for Gay Marriage To Resume in California, NBC POLITICS
(June 26, 2013, 3:05 PM), http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/26/19151971-
supreme-court-strikes-down-defense-of-marriage-act-paves-way-for-gay-marriage-to-
resume-in-california?lite (“Gov. Jerry Brown said counties could begin issuing marriage
licenses to gay couples as soon as one formality was taken care of: A federal appeals 
court had to lift a stay issued by a lower judge.”); see also United States v. Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (holding that DOMA’s definition of marriage was 
unconstitutional); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013) (finding that 
proponents of Proposition 8 did not have standing). 
161. Geoffrey A. Fowler & Vauhini Vara, Gay Marriages Resume in California, 
WALL ST. J. (June 28, 2013, 9:10 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142
4127887323419604578574121442828926 (noting that one of the children of the “first 
couple to marry” attended the ceremony).  California Attorney General Kamala Harris
presided over the San Francisco couple’s wedding, and that same day, Los Angeles Mayor
Antonio Villaraigosa presided over a gay marriage in Los Angeles. Id.
 162. See Miranda Leitsinger, Federal Judge: Michigan Gay Marriage Ban Will Go
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IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF CHILDREN TO MAINTAIN 
FAMILIAL BONDS
“Administrative hassles are usually not seen as a compelling state interest 
that justifies depriving a fundamental right.”163  The United States Supreme
Court has recognized a fundamental liberty interest to parent.164  Although 
the Court has not yet recognized a comparable right of children to
maintain their familial bonds, some courts are pressing the issue.165  One
court at the forefront of this fledgling position held that “a child has an 
independent, constitutionally guaranteed right to maintain contact with a 
person with whom the child has developed a parent-like relationship.”166 
A family court judge in Albany County, New York declared in Webster v. 
Ryan that a child’s interest in maintaining contact with a person the child 
has developed a parent-like relationship with is a fundamental liberty
interest deriving from both the United States Constitution and New York 
State Constitution.167  Because New York State does not provide for that 
163. Lecture by Junichi P. Semitsu, Professor-in-Residence, Univ. of San Diego
Sch. of Law, Constitutional Law II, in San Diego, Cal. (Jan. 14, 2013) (discussing the
levels of constitutional scrutiny); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690
(1973) (“[O]ur prior decisions make clear that, although efficacious administration of
governmental programs is not without some importance, ‘the Constitution recognizes
higher values than speed and efficiency.’” (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656
(1972))).
164. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
165. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 110, 114, 131 (1989).  Despite 
the child’s desire to maintain a filial relationship with both her genetic and presumed
father—her mother’s husband—the Court rejected the concept of “multiple fatherhood.” 
Id. But see Webster v. Ryan, 729 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316 (Fam. Ct. 2001) (holding that the 
child had a constitutional right to maintain a relationship with his de facto parent).
166. Webster, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 316 (footnote omitted).  The child, Alex Ryan, Jr., 
was born in 1995 with a positive toxicology screen for cocaine.  Id. at 317.  Shortly after 
his birth, Alex was removed from his mother’s care and placed in the foster mother’s home.
Id.  In 1999, Alex’s mother’s and father’s parental rights were terminated.  Id. Alex’s 
father had filed four custody petitions, all of which the family court judge had dismissed
without a hearing.  Id.  The appellate court held that the Department of Social Services
had not provided a reasonable reunification plan to the father and that the family court 
judge had thwarted the father’s efforts to reunify with his child. Id. at 317–18.  During Alex’s 
transition from his foster mother’s home to his father’s home, the foster mother filed
petitions for visitation and custody rights.  Id. at 318. For a detailed discussion on the 
recognition of new fundamental rights, see id. at 317–31. 
167. Id. at 316–17. Judge Duggan wrote that the child’s right is a “fundamental 
liberty encompassed within the freedom of association right of the First Amendment of











   
 
 








   
 
   
 
right by statute, the court held that the child was denied the equal protection 
of the laws guaranteed by the United States Constitution and New York 
State Constitution.168  The child in Webster, Alex Ryan, Jr., lived with his
foster mother from his birth in 1995 until April 2000, when he returned 
to his father’s care.169  The court concluded that “a child has a fundamental 
right to maintain contact, over the objection of a parent, with a person 
with whom the child has developed a parent-like relationship.”170 
Despite the Supreme Court not yet recognizing a right of children to 
maintain their familial bonds, these additional parents—even though 
they are currently raising the children—are being deprived of the right to 
parent their children with all of the rights that legal parent status affords. 
These parents qualify as presumed parents, are parenting the children,
and are considered parents by the children; yet, they are denied the 
protection of the law. Likewise, the children are denied the protections
that legal recognition of their parents affords them.  If a court determines
it would be best for the child to find that the child has three legal parents,
the court should have the discretion to make such a finding.
V. CRITICISM OF EXPANDING LEGAL PARENTAGE
A. Criticism of SB 1476 
Although many academics and some practitioners in the area of family
law and child welfare law see the recognition of more than two legal parents 
as a positive change,171 some critics see logistical problems with changing 
the law.172  For example, opposition to SB 1476 came from the Association 
of Certified Family Law Specialists (ACFLS) and the Association of
168. Id.
 169. Id. at 318. 
170. Id.  The court held that the right has constitutional protection but noted that 
the right has to be balanced with “the unquestionable fundamental right of the parent to 
raise his son without undue state interference.” Id.  The court went on to note that it has 
been “firmly established that children are persons within the meaning of the Constitution 
and accordingly possess constitutional rights.” Id. at 330. 
171. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 13, at 381 (arguing that courts should not limit the 
number of legal parents to two and when making such a determination, should engage in
a best interest analysis); Interview with Robert C. Fellmeth, supra note 5 (advocating for
the recognition of more than two legal parents based on the belief that the more parents 
who are willing to contribute to the child’s college fund, the better); see also supra notes 
16–17. 
172. See, e.g., Elizabeth Marquardt, Op-Ed., When 3 Really Is a Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 16, 2007, at A13.  Ms. Marquardt is the Vice President for Family Studies at the 
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Family and Conciliation Courts (AFCC).173  Both organizations expressed
concern that “unintended consequences” of the bill would “be overly
burdensome on the courts.”174  ACFLS expressed concern regarding the
effect “expanding legal parenthood” would have on other areas of law.175 
AFCC expressed concern regarding the effect such a change would have 
on child support: “[T]he current statewide guideline is not set up to handle
child support between more than two parents.  The courts have no money
and there is no one to pay for totally overhauling the existing formula, 
software, etc. to make such a law effective.”176 
B. General Criticism of Expanding Legal Parentage
Critics have raised several concerns regarding the expansion of legal 
parentage.177  Courts have also been hesitant to expand legal parentage.178 
One reason courts are hesitant to expand legal parentage is the “concern 
about putting children in the middle of increasingly complex custody
disputes.”179  Critics would agree with this sentiment.  In response to the
courts’ decisions to expand legal parentage in A.A. v. B.B. and Jacob v. 
Shultz-Jacob, one critic wrote an op-ed piece in the New York Times in
which she expressed four concerns regarding the recognition of more
than two legal parents.180  Her first concern was that because a family with 
three parents will often include two of the parents living together and the 
third living separately, “the child will get shuffled between homes.”181 
As is the case with children of divorce, the children in three-parent
situations will “grow up traveling between two worlds, having to make 
173. See Bill Analysis, S.B. 1476 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 2011–12 Sess.
(Cal. 2012), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_1451-15 00/sb_1476
_cfa_20120507_170523_sen_comm.html.  ACFLS monitors family law legislation. ACFLS 
Purpose, ACFLS, http://www.acfls.org/?page=purpose (last visited June 8, 2014).  AFCC is
“the premier interdisciplinary and international association of professionals dedicated to
the resolution of family conflict.” About AFCC, AFCC, http://www.afccnet.org/About/About
AFCC (last visited June 8, 2014).
174. Bill Analysis, S.B. 1476, supra note 173.
 175. See id.
 176. Id.
 177. See infra notes 179–85. 
178. See Elrod, supra note 133, at 888 (discussing how courts are generally hesitant to
expand rights when not explicitly given the authority to do so by statute).
179. Wald, supra note 13, at 381.  Ms. Wald argues that the other reason is the “distaste 
for ‘non-traditional’ families.”  Id.



















    










sense on their own of the different values, beliefs and ways of living they
find in each home. They have to grow up too soon.”182 
The critic’s second concern was that if three parents choose to live 
together while raising a child, the United States should be prepared for 
these families to push for “the rights and protections of marriage.”183  Third, 
these families may become involved in custody battles in which all three 
parents are living in different homes, thus leading to the possibility that 
the child will have to travel between all three homes.184  Lastly, in some 
situations, there may be up to five people involved in bringing the child 
into the world, and if legal recognition is given to three legal parents,
there is no barrier preventing all five people from seeking legal parent
status.185  The critic argues that “in the best interests of children, no court
should break open the rule of two when assigning legal parenthood.”186 
VI. RESPONSE TO CRITICISM AND SUPPORT FOR EXPANDING 
THE TWO-PARENT LIMIT
A. Response to Criticism of SB 1476 
In his veto message for SB 1476, Governor Brown cited the concern
about “unintended consequences” that ACFLS and AFCC had raised.187 
With respect to the ACFLS concern that recognizing more than two legal 
parents would affect other areas of law,188 this will likely be the case. 
Parentage affects many areas of law; however, just because it may affect
these areas does not mean it should not be done.  The number of cases in
which three legal parents would be appropriate is small by virtue of the 
presumed parent requirement.  Additionally, by giving courts the discretion 
to find more than two legal parents, the legislature is not mandating courts 
to make this finding.  Therefore, judicial discretion, as with SB 274, will 
limit the number of these cases because “a court may find more than two 
parents” but is not required to do so.189 
182. Id.
 183. Id.; see also GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 12–13, 16 (discussing
the benefits of marriage, including financial ones, such as tax advantages, and other benefits, 
including the right to visit the sick spouse in the hospital and bury the dead spouse). 
CAL. LEGIS. INFO. (Sept. 30, 2012), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_
184. 
185. 
See Marquardt, supra note 172, at A13.
See id.
 186. Id.
 187. See Governor’s Veto Message, Bill Status, SB-1476 Family Law: Parentage, 
1451-1500/sb_1476_vt_20120930.html; see also Bill Analysis, S.B. 1476, supra note 173. 
188. Bill Analysis, S.B. 1476, supra note 173. 
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The Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental right to parent.190 
Yet, people who are functioning as parents, consider themselves parents, 
and are considered parents by their children are not legally protected in
this right because of the two-parent limit.  Because the right to parent is 
a fundamental liberty interest, any limitation on the right would be subject 
to strict scrutiny.191  If strict scrutiny review is applied to the two-parent
limit, it would fail on an administrative convenience argument because 
“[a]dministrative hassles are usually not seen as a compelling state interest
that justifies depriving a fundamental right.”192  Although this proposal
would affect other areas of law, families to which this law would apply
need legal protection of their parent-child relationships. 
Moreover, an elimination of the two-parent limit would likely result in 
increased revenue for states.  With more legal parents, there will likely be
more parents obligated to pay child support.193  With respect to the AFCC 
concern regarding California’s child support system, the California Senate
Appropriations Committee determined with regard to SB 274 that the child
support system would not have to be reprogramed to take into account a
third parent because the court is responsible for making the initial child 
support order.194  Because the Department of Child Support Services would
190. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
191. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).  The Court wrote, “The 
liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and
control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court.” Id. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees this right: “The Clause also includes a substantive component that ‘provides 
heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights
and liberty interests.’” Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997)).
But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989) (plurality opinion) (rejecting 
the child’s argument that her equal protection claim deserves strict scrutiny review because
the state discriminated against her based upon her illegitimate status). 
192. Supra note 163. 
193. See, e.g., Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 475–76 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)
(affirming the trial court’s order, which required two adults to make child support payments);
Bill Analysis, S.B. 1476, supra note 173. According to the United States Census Bureau, 
the average monthly child support payment in 2010 was $430.  This equates to $5160
annually.  Monthly Child Support Payments Average $430 Per Month in 2010, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (June 19, 2012), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/ releases/archives/children/ 
cb12-109.html. 
194. See Bill Analysis, S.B. 274 Before the S. Appropriations Comm., 2013–14 
Sess. (Cal. 2013), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml. 
With respect to court costs, the Judicial Council estimated that with the passing of SB 274,
























   
 
   
    
    






    
 
become involved only if there were changed circumstances justifying an 
alteration of the support order and because the department would use the 
court’s initial order as a guide, the recognition of more than two legal 
parents would not require a “system change.”195 
Additionally, collecting child support from more than one parent would
better ensure the child’s needs are being met and reduce the odds that the 
child is receiving public assistance.196  By accommodating more parents 
in the child support scheme, states could save money and also increase the
likelihood that children are receiving child support.197  Not only would the
child have the right to receive financial support from all three parents, the
child would also have “access to health insurance, benefits, and inheritance
rights.”198  Moreover, the child would have the right to maintain a relationship 
with the additional parent.
The most common child support models—the income-sharing and
percentage-of-income models—are premised on a family consisting of two 
parents.199 The income-sharing model reviews the income of both parents,
and the percentage-of-income model focuses only on the income of the
noncustodial parent.200  A parent’s child support obligation should depend
on the amount of involvement and thus amount of responsibility the parent 
has in the child’s life.201  Therefore, courts should fashion child support
payments according to the parents’ relative amounts of custodial time.202 
Because two parents will be primarily responsible for the child and thus 
receive the benefit of more contact with the child, they should also be
primarily responsible for the child’s financial support.203  Although a third
make a best interest determination in each case and the Senate Appropriations Committee 
estimated a financial cost of “less than $25,000 annually.”  Id.
 195. See id.
 196. See Introduced Bill Text, S.B. 1476, supra note 142. 
197. The problem with child support is states cannot find fathers.  Interview with 
Robert C. Fellmeth, supra note 5.  Here, fathers and mothers are coming forward. Id.
 198. Introduced Bill Text, S.B. 1476, supra note 142. 
199. See Jacobs, supra note 14, at 226 (citing Adrienne Jennings Lockie, Multiple
Families, Multiple Goals, Multiple Failures: The Need for “Limited Equalization” as a 
Theory of Child Support, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 109, 115, 139–40 (2009)). 
200. See id. California has an income-sharing model.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4053(c) 
(West 2014); CAL. DEP’T OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVS., supra note 146, at 11 (“Child support 
guidelines are based on various factors, including monthly net income of both parents and the
amount of time the child spends with each parent. . . . In some specific cases, the court 
may decide not to use the income guidelines to determine the amount of child support.”). 
201. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
202. See Jacobs, supra note 14, at 223, 225–26 (“Financial obligations and custodial 
rights should be linked.”). 
203. See id. at 223 (advocating for a disaggregation of parental rights and 
responsibilities so more than two people can hold the title of legal parent, thereby allowing 
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or fourth parent will not have to contribute a third or a quarter of the 
child’s financial support, what the additional parent does provide, which
will be in proportion to the parent’s amount of custodial time, will give the 
child at least some financial support.204 
B. Response to General Criticism of Expanding Legal Parentage
With respect to the concern about involving children in complex
custody disputes, these disputes will continue to occur as the number of
nontraditional families grows, despite the courts’ practice of limiting 
legal parentage to two adults.205  Courts should not be forced to abide by
the principle that a child can have only two legal parents based on the 
idea that such a principle spares children from messy custody disputes. 
It is better to have the child involved in a custody dispute that will resolve 
what is best for the child, rather than limiting the number of protected
relationships the child can have.206  The most appropriate resolution for the
child may be for the court to find that the child has more than two legal 
parents. 
Regarding the concern that recognizing more than two legal parents 
will result in the shuffling of children between homes, this point is unrelated
to parental status.207  Recognizing more than two legal parents is a best
204. See id. at 227 (“Ultimately, the amount of support a third parent should contribute 
will vary, depending upon the intent of the parties and relationship that the parent builds 
with the child.”).
205. See Wald, supra note 13 (“So far, courts have been reluctant to find more than
two parents for any given child due to some combination of distaste for ‘non–traditional’
families and concern about putting children in the middle of increasingly complex
custody disputes.”); see also Bill Analysis, S.B. 274 Before the Assemb. Floor, 2013–14 
Sess. (Cal. 2013), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml
(“While cases involving more than two parents are, almost by definition, complicated and will
require courts to balance many competing interests, courts must already do so today.”). 
206. In response to the President of ACFLS Diane Wasznicky’s concern about the 
complex custody disputes that will result if courts are given the discretion to recognize 
that a child has more than two legal parents, Beth Allen, an attorney who handled third-
parent adoptions, said, “So often, we are struggling with parents who don’t want the 
responsibilities and obligations of parenting . . . .  So when you have another parent willing to
step up and take on those responsibilities, aren’t we so lucky?”  Lovett, supra note 1, at 
A13 (internal quotation marks omitted).  When making a custody order, the court should
consider the child’s position.  To ensure the child’s voice stands out during the dispute 
between the parents, the court should appoint an attorney for the child.  See Elrod, supra
note 133, at 870.  For a discussion on the mandatory appointment of client-directed
attorneys for children involved in family court proceedings, see Elrod, supra note 133. 
































   
    
  
interest determination, which courts already have to make.  States should 
not categorically preclude their courts from finding that a child has more
than two legal parents.  A family with multiple homes gives children more 
options in terms of where they want to live.  It is not necessarily a negative
thing. 
Moreover, families that want all three parents involved in the child’s
life may want the child to have the experience of living in each parent’s
home, even if all three parents are not afforded legal protection.  Although 
this will necessarily involve the child having more than one home, these 
families will continue the practice despite the law not affording legal
protection to all of their members. Not recognizing a child’s third parent 
as a legal parent will not deter these families from forming and living the 
way that suits them.  Failing to provide the third parent legal status makes 
the entire family vulnerable.  These families need to be afforded legal
protection.
With respect to the argument that recognition of three legal parents 
may result in a child traveling between three homes,208 this is a possibility,
but the parties would need to come to an agreement regarding custody and
visitation. If they could not, the court would make an order dividing
custody and visitation among the parents according to the child’s best
interest, including the child’s stability.209  In California, the legislators
addressed the continuity and stability criticism of SB 1476 when drafting 
SB 274 by specifically including that language in section 3040 of the 
Family Code: “[T]he court shall allocate custody and visitation among
the parents based on the best interest of the child, including, but not limited
to, addressing the child’s need for continuity and stability by preserving 
established patterns of care and emotional bonds.”210  Moreover, the
legislators recognized that granting more than two parents legal parent 
status does not mean all three parents have to be treated equally, writing,
“The court may order that not all parents share legal or physical custody
of the child.”211  The court has the discretion to craft an appropriate
208. See id.
 209. See Introduced Bill Text, S.B. 1476, supra note 142. During discussions about
custody and visitation, the court should appoint an attorney to represent the child to make sure
the child’s voice is heard. See Elrod, supra note 133, at 870.  Although nontraditional 
families will continue to advocate in family court for legal recognition of all of their members 
and seek resolution of disputes regarding issues related to their children, traditional 
families will continue to resort to court for similar matters, such as custody, visitation,
and child support.  Because children involved in family court proceedings have a substantial 
interest in where they live, with whom they live, and with whom they can and cannot 
visit, an attorney should be appointed to represent them.  Id. 
210. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(d) (West 2014).
211. Id.; see also Bill Analysis, S.B. 274, supra note 154 (“In most . . . cases, only
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custody and visitation order, and finding that a child has three legal parents
does not mean the court has committed to giving the third parent the 
same custody and visitation rights as the other two.
The argument that affording three parents legal protection will ultimately
result in these parents seeking “the rights and protections of marriage” is
baseless.212  In granting rights to, and imposing obligations on, a third
parent, the focus is on the child and the child’s legal relationship to all three
parents, not on the parents’ relationships to each other. Although one could 
argue it would be best for the children if these families were afforded the 
protections of marriage—a marriage of all three parents—this is not a 
reasonable proposition. Typically, these families consist of a couple and 
a friend of the couple who agrees to assist the couple in procreating, and 
all agree it would be best for the child to have three parents involved.213 
These are not polygamous arrangements.  
Another concern is that giving courts the discretion to find more than 
two legal parents may result in courts going too far, such as by finding a 
fifth legal parent.214  There may be cases in which such a finding is
appropriate, but it is unlikely.  Under the traditional best interest standard,
the court has to determine first, who qualifies as a presumed parent, and 
second, whether the best interest of the child requires the court to find 
that the child has more than two legal parents.215  Because any additional 
parents the court considers would need to qualify as presumed parents, this
number will be relatively small.  There is only so much time in the day for
a child to develop a parent-child relationship with more than two people,
and there are only a few ways in which a person can achieve presumed
parent status.216 Both the presumed parent requirement and best interest
standard limit the number of situations in which the court could find that
212. See Marquardt, supra note 172, at A13. 
213. See, e.g., Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 475–76, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2007) (discussing a family consisting of a biological mother, the mother’s former lesbian
partner, and a sperm donor); A.A. v. B.B. (2007), 220 O.C.A. 115, para. 1 (Can. Ont. C.A.)
(discussing a family consisting of a lesbian couple and their friend, the biological father);
Gray, supra note 30; Hall, supra note 30 (same); Lovett, supra note 1, at A9 (discussing
a family consisting of four parents: a gay couple and a lesbian couple). The two-parent
limit also affects heterosexual couples who choose to conceive with the help of ART. 
See, e.g., Bellafante, supra note 33, at MB5 (discussing a family that had consisted of a 
biological mother and her boyfriend, who had conceived with the help of a sperm donor). 
214. See Marquardt, supra note 172, at A13.
 215. See Introduced Bill Text, S.B. 1476, supra note 142. 
216. See supra note 143. 
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a child has more than two legal parents, and finding that a child has more 
than two presumed parents does not mean the court would find that the 
child has more than two legal parents. 
Lastly, recognition of more than two legal parents may have the effect 
of keeping some children out of foster care because the court would have
more placement options for the child.217  The more potential resources a 
child has, the less likely it is the child will end up under the supervision of 
the state, as the odds increase that there will be at least one appropriate 
parental resource for the child.  This would save the state money because
the state would not have to compensate the child’s foster family for
expenses incurred as a result of caring for the child. 
VII. PROPOSED REFORMS 
Despite the fact that few states explicitly recognize more than two
legal parents, courts are increasingly providing rights to, and imposing 
obligations on, third parties, many of whom are acting as third parents to 
children.218  Although this movement toward some recognition of third
parties is progress, it is not enough to protect families that do not fit the 
traditional mold.  These families will continue to go to court seeking legal 
recognition of all of their members, and courts will continue to be 
constrained by the two-parent limit.  State legislatures must give courts
the discretion to find that a child has more than two legal parents if such
a finding is in the child’s best interest.
A. Giving Courts Discretion 
As proposed by California SB 1476 and SB 274, courts should have 
the discretion to find that a child has more than two legal parents.219 
Such a decision should be made only in light of the court finding that a 
child has more than two presumed parents.220  Instead of requiring courts
to reconcile competing presumptions of parentage such that a child has 
only two legal parents, state legislatures should give courts the authority
to find that a child has more than two legal parents if such a finding is in
the child’s best interest.221 
217. See, e.g., In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 877 (Ct. App. 2011) (discussing 
the competing presumptions of three presumed parents in the context of a child placed in
foster care); Bellafante, supra note 33, at MB5 (describing the child’s placement in 
foster care because he is not biologically related to his intending father).
218. See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text. 
219. See Bill Analysis, S.B. 274, supra note 159; Introduced Bill Text, S.B. 1476, 
supra note 142. 
220. See S.B. 274, 2013–14 Sess. (Cal. 2013); S.B. 1476, 2011–12 Sess. (Cal. 2012). 
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Under California law, the guide courts are given to resolve competing 
presumptions is “the presumption which on the facts is founded on the
weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.”222  This is a very
subjective standard and forces courts to choose which parents have legal
parent status.223  Because this decision has to be made in light of the overall 
“best interest of the child” standard, a court may feel that the presumptions 
need not be reconciled at all. A court may find that resolving the 
presumptions is not in the child’s best interest and that the most appropriate 
decision would be to afford all three parents legal parent status.  Because
of this, courts should not be precluded from making such a finding.  To 
make courts feel comfortable finding that a child has more than two legal 
parents, state legislatures should amend their parentage laws to remove 
the bright-line rule of two.
As the California Court of Appeal stated in In re M.C., a change like 
this needs to come from the legislature.224 Courts are hesitant to recognize 
rights in the absence of a statute.225  Therefore, before courts will feel
comfortable recognizing more than two legal parents or affirming decisions
that do so in light of current precedents, state legislatures must enact statutes
that provide courts with this discretion. 
As families increasingly become nontraditional with the help of new 
technology, state legislatures need to update their parentage laws to afford
legal protection to family formations that had not been contemplated at the
time the laws were enacted.226  As courts have acknowledged, states’
parentage laws are out of date in that they no longer reflect the current needs 
of families.227 Although the courts and legislatures have taken some steps
to keep up with the proliferation of nontraditional family forms, they have
222. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b) (West 2014).  California Family Code section
7612(b) remains unchanged after the passage of SB 274.  See id. The legislators remedied the
situation by adding a new subsection that allows courts to find that a child has more than 
two legal parents if recognizing less than that number would be detrimental to the child. 
See id. § 7612(c). 
223. See Introduced Bill Text, S.B. 1476, supra note 142. 
224.  123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 870 (Ct. App. 2011). 
225. See Elrod, supra note 133, at 888. 
226. See supra note 134.  In Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
acknowledged that the matter was better left to the legislature but fashioned a remedy
anyway. 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); see supra note 119. 
227. See, e.g., In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 869–70 (“We agree these issues are 
critical, and California’s existing statutory framework is ill-equipped to resolved them.”);
Jacob, 923 A.2d at 482 (acknowledging that the legislature had not yet spoken on the 
matter but stating it was the court’s duty to construct an appropriate remedy).
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not gone far enough.228  State legislatures must untie courts’ hands to 
enable them to do their job—determining the best interest of children.229  
1. Competing Presumptions 
Because there are various ways of achieving presumed parent status, 
including by marriage, biology, conduct, and intent, there are situations
in which more than two people qualify as presumed parents.  Part of the
reason for the multiple ways in which a person can achieve presumed
parent status is that courts wish to find that a child has two parents rather 
than only one.230  As a result, when a third person qualifies as a presumed
228. See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text. 
229. For example, the United States Supreme Court in Michael H. v. Gerald D.
chose not to recognize dual fatherhood when it upheld a California statute that precluded 
the genetic father from rebutting the marital presumption.  491 U.S. 110, 118 (1989)
(plurality opinion).  Despite the child’s desire to maintain a filial relationship with both 
her genetic and presumed father—her mother’s husband—the Court rejected the concept 
of “multiple fatherhood.”  Id. at 110, 114, 131. 
Michael H. is a great example of the law leading to harsh results.  The child was unable
to have her relationship with her biological father legally recognized.  If both the father
and child seek to have their relationship acknowledged by the law, courts should at least 
be able to consider it.  With the current rule-of-two approach, they are unable to do so. 
This all leads to the question of why states preclude courts from finding that a child has 
more than two legal parents.  If the thinking is that doing so provides protection to the 
institution of marriage, that thinking is off base and out of date.  If the standard really is 
“best interest of the child,” the child and the preservation of the child’s existing
relationships should be at the forefront of the best interest determination.  With the law
as it currently stands, courts are sometimes precluded from making the best possible
orders for children.  In Michael H., a case in which the child was old enough to express 
her feelings, the law should have allowed the court at least to consider the possibility that 
the child had more than two legal parents. It would have been appropriate for the court 
to afford legal parent status to the child’s biological father, which would have resulted in 
the child having three legal parents.  Id. at 130–31; see also Jacobs, supra note 14, at 225
(“Why limit support, access to health insurance, inheritance, and other benefits when
more choices are available?  Ignoring the issue will not make the cases go away; rather, 
we should develop a viable framework so that courts can best protect children, their
relationships with all parental figures, and provide for the children’s financial security.”). 
230. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 667, 670 (Cal. 2005) 
(discussing In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932, 936–37 (Cal. 2002), in which the court held
that it was inappropriate to rebut the presumed parent presumption because there were no
competing claims to paternity and rebutting the presumption would result in the child 
being fatherless); People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495, 499–500 (Cal. 1968) (upholding the 
conviction of the mother’s sterile husband for willful failure to provide for his minor
child because he had consented to the artificial insemination of his wife with semen from 
a donor).  In Sorensen, the court wrote, “A child conceived through heterologous artificial 
insemination does not have a ‘natural father,’ as that term[] is commonly used. . . . Since
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parent, the court is required to resolve the presumptions such that the 
child has only two legal parents.231 
Instead of limiting the number of protected relationships a child has 
and instead of providing half-protections, such as awarding the presumed 
parent visitation or requiring the presumed parent to pay child support, 
states should provide these relationships the full protection of the law by
giving courts the discretion to find that a child has more than two legal 
parents. To allow courts to make such findings, state legislatures need to 
amend the statutes that require courts to resolve competing parentage
presumptions.  Courts should not be limited by the absolute rule of two 
when making best interest determinations. 
2. Effect on Custody, Visitation, and Child Support 
States should give courts the discretion to allocate custody and visitation 
among the parents according to the child’s best interest.232  Because courts
will have to consider the practicality of any custody or visitation order and 
the effect such an order would have on the child’s stability, it is unlikely 
the arrangement would be overly burdensome on the child.  Additionally,
discussions regarding custody and visitation should include the child’s 
opinion.  Courts, when determining custody and visitation arrangements,
should do so in light of the parents’ involvement in the child’s daily life: the
parents who have the most “daily responsibility for the child . . . should
have greater rights and responsibility regarding the raising of the child than
a third—or fourth—parent who contributes less, or no, financial support and
less emotional support and has a more tenuous relationship with the 
child.”233 
With respect to child support, courts should divide parents’ obligations
based on the statewide uniform guidelines.234  This means that the child 
support each parent pays would depend on the parent’s income and the 
231. See, e.g., In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 861, 877. 
232. See Introduced Bill Text, S.B. 1476, supra note 142. 
233. Jacobs, supra note 14, at 223. 
234. See Introduced Bill Text, S.B. 1476, supra note 142; CAL. DEP’T OF CHILD 
SUPPORT SERVS., supra note 146, at 11.  As California has recognized, allowing courts to 
find that a child has more than two legal parents does not require a reformulation of the 
child support formula.  See Bill Analysis, S.B. 274, supra note 194. Because the court is 
responsible for calculating the initial child support award, the court will just have to 







   
 
 





   
 
    
  









amount of time the parent spends with the child.235  If courts divide the
financial responsibilities in accordance with custodial rights, it should 
not be difficult for them to devise an appropriate support order.236  Although 
managing multiple parenthood will be difficult, children in nontraditional 
families will benefit from the additional security that recognition of multiple
parenthood affords, specifically the right to receive financial support from
and maintain relationships with those who have acted as parents to them.237 
Moreover, as the California Child Support Handbook states, courts in 
some cases “may decide not to use the income guidelines to determine 
the amount of child support.”238 This suggests that courts have some leeway
in terms of the child support orders they make.  Because of this, a court, in 
the case of a family with more than two presumed parents, could find that 
the child has three presumed parents, not resolve the competing 
presumptions, and divide the child support obligations according to the
parents’ income and amount of custodial time.  As one academic who has 
written extensively in this area of law put it, “Why limit support, access to
health insurance, inheritance, and other benefits . . . ? [W]e should develop 
a viable framework so that courts can best protect children, their 
relationships with all parental figures, and provide for the children’s
financial security.”239  The bright-line rule of two legal parents no longer
reflects current family formations and restricts courts’ ability to make orders 
consistent with the child’s best interest.  For these reasons, state legislatures 
should amend their parentage laws to give courts the discretion to find 
that a child has more than two legal parents. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Many states’ parentage schemes are outdated.  Although the law has 
evolved somewhat to provide protection to nontraditional families, it has 
not gone far enough.  These families will continue to go to court seeking
legal protection of their relationships, and courts will continue to be
constrained by the two-parent limit. 
235. See CAL. DEP’T OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVS., supra note 146, at 11. 
236. Id.; see also Jacobs, supra note 14, at 226 (“When three people jointly decide
to have a child, two will likely be the primary caretakers, and the primary caretakers
should bear a greater financial burden to support the child than a parent with limited 
custodial and/or visitation rights. By allocating responsibility in proportion with custodial 
rights, courts should be able to fashion a reasonable financial support award. . . . Limiting the
financial obligation of a third party protects that individual from a high support award; 
conversely, the link and limitations on support and custodial rights protects the primary
parents from too much custodial interference from the third party.”).
237. See Jacobs, supra note 14, at 224. 
238. CAL. DEP’T OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVS., supra note 146, at 11. 
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State legislatures must amend their parentage laws to give courts the 
discretion to find that a child has more than two legal parents. Courts 
would be able to make such a finding only if it was in the child’s best 
interest.  It is time for states to stop paying lip service to protecting a child’s
best interest and start heeding the overwhelming evidence that demands 
these changes.
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